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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FORMEN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, DON SKIPWORTH, 
and FRED SMITH, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
MEL PARKS, PARKS ENTERPRISES, 
INC., an Idaho corporation, 
NASKY JOINT VENTURE, a 
partnership, DEL TAYLOR, 
NANCY TAYLOR, his wife, 
LARRY ANDERSON, HAL PARKS. 
JERRY PARKS, STARLA PETERSON 
aka STARLA PARKS, (now STARLA 
MAYERS, BRYCE AVERILL. HARRY 
KEITH HUFFAKER, ELZA HUFFAKER, 
his Wife, THOMAS GENE REID, 
MARY REID, his wife, WANDA 
HOPPER, PARKS & SONS 
SANITATION, INC., a Utah 
corporation, PARKS & SONS 
INTERMOUNTAIN, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, and JOHN DOES 
I through X, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
Case No. 20426 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was there competent evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that plaintiffs brought this action in 
bad faith and that the action was without basis in 
fact or law? 
2. Was there competent evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that no defendant intentionally or 
improperly interfered with plaintiff's business, and 
that plaintiff failed to present believable evidence 
of damages? 
3. Was there competent evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that no defendant made any unprivi-
leged, false, defamatory statement concerning the 
plaintiffs? 
4. Was there competent evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that Formen Corporation and Parks 
Enterprises, Inc. were mutually mistaken concerning 
the written provisions of the dissolution agreement? 
5. Were there any disputes of fact material to the 
summary judgment for the foreclosure defendants? 
6. Did the plaintiffs establish a prima facie antitrust 
case, where there was no evidence of a conspiracy? 
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in its 
evidentiary rulings? 
8. Are defendants entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
for defending this appeal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is predominantly an action 
for slander and interference with business relations brought 
by Formen Corporation (Formen), the developer of a subdivision in 
Sanpete County, and by certain principals of Formen, against 
certain residents and former residents of the subdivision. 
Defendants' counterclaims sought an award of attorney's fees for 
bad faith prosecution, reformation of a joint venture dissolution 
agreement between Formen and defendant Parks Enterprises, Inc. 
and rescission of purchase agreements between Formen and certain 
defendants. 
2 
B. Summary Of Proceedings and Disposition In Trial Court, 
Formen's Verified Complaint1 was filed on January 19, 1983 • 
Contemporaneously with filing the complaint, Formen sought and 
obtained an Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order 
which prohibited the defendants, inter alia, from making any 
written communications with each other and from making any 
defamatory statements concerning Formen. (R. 70-73). The 
hearing on the Order to Show Cause [why a preliminary injunction 
should not issue] was held on February 2, 1983. (R. 74-76). 
After consideration of Formen's evidence, the Court denied 
the motion for a preliminary injunction. (Id.) 
Don Charlesworth, named as a defendant in the initial 
complaint, apparently settled with Formen prior to the filing 
of the Amended Verified Complaint on July 7, 1983. Larry 
Anderson settled with plaintiffs sometime before trial. (Tr. 
210-211). 
The Amended Verified Complaint, (hereinafter "complaint") 
filed July 7, 1983, added Fred Smith and Don Skipworth as 
plaintiffs,2 and included the following claims; (1) Tortious 
interference, against all defendants; (2) slander of Formen, 
against all defendants; (3) slander of Don Skipworth, against all 
defendants; (4) slander of Fred Smith, against all defendants; 
xThe complaint stated claims for tortious interference with 
business relations, slander, anti-trust violations, and sought 
injunctive relief and $18,000,000 in damages. Fred Smith and 
Don Skipworth were not named as plaintiffs in the initial complaint, 
2The complaint also added Parks & Sons Sanitation, Inc., 
and Parks and Sons Intermountain, Inc., as defendants, but those 
entities were never served with process nor was an appearance 
entered on their behalf. 
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(5) negligence, against Mel Parks; (6) antitrust violations, 
against all defendants; (7) injunctive relief, against all 
defendants; (8) foreclosure against Thomas Gene Reid and Mary 
Jean Reid; (9) foreclosure against Bryce Averill and Mary B. 
Averill3; and (10) foreclosure against Harry Keith Huffaker and 
Elza B. Huffaker (R. 912-53), 
Defendants answered the complaint, and counterclaimed for 
(1) malicious and bad faith prosecution; (2) defamation; (3) 
reformation of the joint venture dissolution agreement, by Parks 
Enterprises, Inc., against Formen Corporation; (4) refund of 
purchase monies paid, by Bryce Averill, Mr. and Mrs. Huffaker, 
and Mr. and Mrs. Reid (foreclosure defendants) against Formen 
Corporation; and (5) rescission of purchase agreements, by 
foreclosure defendants against Formen. (R. 1196-1207). 
On September 12, 1983, Formen moved for summary judgment 
of foreclosure against the foreclosure defendants. (R. 
1182-1183). The foreclosure defendants consented to reconvey 
their lots, and moved for summary judgment on their counterclaims 
for rescission of their purchase agreements and for a refund of 
monies paid. (R. 1265-66). On November 7, 1983, all of the 
defendants (except Don Charlesworth and Larry Anderson)4 moved 
3Mary Averill, the wife of Bryce Averill, was not named as 
a defendant in the pleading heading and was never served with 
process nor was an appearance entered on her behalf. 
4Don Charlesworth and Larry Anderson were each represented 
by counsel other than those appearing herein. The term 
"defendants," shall hereinafter refer only to those defendants, 
the names of whom are underlined on the case heading, who were 
represented by the defense counsel appearing herein. 
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for summary judgment against the plaintiffs on all issues raised 
by the plaintiffs1 complaint. (R. 1210-11). 
By order dated March 27, 1984, the court granted the 
foreclosure defendants1 motion for summary judgment of rescission 
and for a refund of purchase monies paid; dismissed the plain-
tiffs1 amended complaint as against Nasky Joint Venture, Jerry 
Parks, Starla Parks (Mayers), and Wanda Hopper; and dismissed 
the Seventh Cause of Action (for injunctive relief) as against 
all defendants. The court denied the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment as against the remaining defendants and issues. 
(R. 1645-47). 
The trial of the remaining causes of action was heard 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, sitting without a jury, on 
August 27-31, 1984. At the close of the plaintiffs1 case, 
defendants made a motion to dismiss. (Tr. 633) . Plaintiffs 
stipulated to the dismissal of the Fifth Cause of Action 
(negligence against Mel Parks). (Tr. 636). The court granted 
the defendants1 motion as to all other causes of action. (Tr. 
706) . 
Defendants' counterclaim for malicious prosecution was 
dismissed without prejudice during the course of trial pursuant 
to the stipulation of the parties, (Tr. 459-60), reserving the 
claims for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 
(Supp. 1983), and for reformation of the joint venture 
dissolution agreement. After the presentation of defendants' 
case on these two claims, the plaintiffs having presented no 
evidence in response thereto other than cross-examination of 
5 
defendants1 witnesses, the court took the matter under 
advisement. Pursuant to the court's directive and a stipulation 
of the parties, the parties waived oral arguments, but presented 
written arguments, (Tr. 905-907). 
By order dated October 30, 1984, the court awarded judgment 
for defendants on their counterclaim, both as to attorneyfs fees 
and reformation. (R. 1788-1790). Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 1791-1798), and a Judgment (R. 1799-1802), 
were entered on December 19, 1984, and plaintiffs thereafter 
perfected this appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
This action concerns the developers and residents of 
Hideaway Valley (Hideaway), a subdivision located in a 
mountainous area of Sanpete County, Utah. Formen is a Utah 
corporation whose stockholders and officers during all times 
relevant herein included J. Fred Smith and Don R. Skipworth. 
(Tr. 51, 244). Parks Enterprises, Inc. (Parks Enterprises), is a 
Utah corporation whose stockholders and officers were members of 
the Mel Parks family (Parks) .5 Mel Parks is the father of Nancy 
Taylor, Hal Parks, Jerry Parks and Starla Mayers. Del Taylor is 
the husband of Nancy Taylor. (Tr. 817-818). Defendants Bryce 
Averill, Harry Keith Huffaker (Keith Huffaker) and Elza Huffaker, 
Thomas Gene Reid (Gene Reid) and Mary Reid (Jean Reid), and Wanda 
Hopper are not related to the Parks, but were also current or 
5Plaintiffs presented no evidence at trial concerning who 
were the stockholders or officers of Parks Enterprises. 
Documents produced and Answers to Interrogatories on file 
indicate that various members of the Parks family were 
stockholders and officers. (R. 1090-1093). 
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former residents of Hideaway at the time this action was 
commenced. 
In the fall of 1977, Formen and Parks Enterprises formed a 
joint venture to develop Elkridge Ranches, a subdivision in the 
same general area as Hideaway. The parties entered into a Joint 
Venture Agreement, which provided that profits and expenses of 
the joint venture were to be split 50/50. (Ex. 1). The project 
was successful, and in May, 1979, Smith proposed the joint 
development of a new project, Hideaway Valley, on the same basis 
as Elkridge. (Tr. 719). Parks Enterprises orally agreed to the 
expansion (Tr. 721), and the parties proceeded to develop the 
ground and sell lots pursuant to the oral "understanding." (Tr. 
767-68). 
In the spring of 1981, Formen suggested that the agreement 
be put in writing for tax purposes (Tr. 726-27), and proposed an 
arrangement whereby profits would be split 75% to Formen and 
25% to Parks Enterprises. (Tr. 728). Parks were shocked by the 
proposal (Tr. 729-730) , as they had understood the agreement to 
be 50% to each corporation. (Tr. 719, 726, 771). The parties 
were not able to reach an agreement, and ultimately dissolved 
the Elkridge joint venture and discontinued their joint efforts 
in Hideaway. A Memorandum of Joint Venture Dissolution, the 
purpose of which was to equally divide the assets (Tr. 738, 832), 
was signed in April, 1981, effective December 31, 1980. (Ex. 2). 
Parks, who had built a large complex (four separate dwelling 
areas connected to a central recreation and service area) to 
house their families and to enhance the value of the subdivision 
7 
(Tr. 768), continued to live in Hideaway after the dissolution. 
Other individuals also moved into the subdivision and established 
homes. 
Sales efforts in Hideaway were made predominantly by 
salesmen employed by Formen (Tr. 763), and by Fred Smith's 
brother, Max Smith, who was an employee of Red Z, Inc., a 
corporation owned by Fred Smith. (Tr. 335, 611) . Some of the 
salesmen had made promises to some purchasers which had not been 
kept. For example, Max Smith had promised Huffakers that 
electricity would be readily available, that roads would be 
maintained and snow removed, and that a septic tank would be 
installed for them. Huffakers felt the promises had not been 
kept. (Tr. 213-214, 218). Larry Anderson had been promised that 
roads would provide accessability to the lots, but the roads 
were impassible at times. (Tr. 237-238, Ex. 32). Bryce Averill 
was told that he could place a house trailer on his lot, but 
later discovered that county regulations prohibited it. (Tr. 
228) . 
Formen, in connection with developing Hideaway, had formed 
a property owners1 association (Association), one of the 
responsibilities of which was to maintain the roads. During the 
first part of August, 1982, the property owners received a 
notice that the Association was charging an assessment of $65 
per year. (Tr. 110-112). The trustees of the Association at 
that time were the officers of Formen. (Tr. 110, Ex. 8A) , and 
the assessment notice had been mailed in Formen envelopes. (Tr. 
110, Ex. 8B). 
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On or about August 8, 1982, several property owners held an 
informal meeting at the Baker residence to discuss the 
assessment. As a result of that meeting, a second meeting was 
held at the Parks1 complex on or about August 15, 1982, and Don 
Skipworth was invited to attend and respond to questions 
concerning the assessment. (Tr. 115). Skipworth did not give 
the property owners any budget or projection of how the money 
would be spent, but stated to them that he, as trustee, "[was] 
the Association and [would] decide how the money would be 
spent." (Tr. 116). This same type of statement was also 
attributed to Fred Smith. (Tr. 81). 
Apparently as a result of the desire of the homeowners to 
have a voice in the management of the Association, an Association 
meeting was held on October 3, 1982. Mel Parks, Fred Smith, Pat 
Mounteer, Don Charlesworth and LaMar Macklin were elected as 
trustees at that meeting. (Tr. 117, 485). The new trustees, 
among other things, discussed the possibility of purchasing a 
road grader or road patrol. (Tr. 487, 489). Mel Parks and one 
other trustee6 voted in favor of purchasing a used machine. The 
other three trustees voted against the proposal, apparently 
having been persuaded by Fred Smith, who didn't think an old 
machine would work. (Tr. 489). 
Because winter was approaching, the trustees continued to 
discuss the issue of road maintenance and snow removal, but were 
6Minutes of the meeting, which were read by the court but 
not offered into evidence (T. 492), indicate the trustee voting 
with Mel Parks was Don Charlesworth, one of the initial 
defendants in this action. 
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unable to reach an agreement. (Tr. 497) . Other issues also 
polarized the board, including whether to hold an annual meeting 
of members in January, 1983, as called for in the Association 
by-laws, and whether to allow voting rights to those members who 
had not paid their assessments, (Ex. 35). At a trustee's 
meeting held January 10, 1983, a majority of the trustees 
purported to "release" Mel Parks from his position on the board 
of trustees. (Tr. 337, Ex. 35).7 Several homeowners 
subsequently sent a letter to members of the Association, 
protesting what they characterized as "undermining" of their 
rights as property owners, and calling for an annual meeting at 
which complaints could be aired. (Ex. 35). 
On the afternoon of January 18, 1983, Formen, through its 
attorney, sent a paid investigator to Hideaway Valley. The 
investigator posed as an individual interested in purchasing 
property in the area, and asked the various residents he 
contacted certain pointed questions concerning Formen and its 
officers. (R. 93-99). This action was filed the following 
morning, January 19, at 11:08 a.m. (R. 1). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment of the trial court, dismissing the plaintiffs1 
action pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), should be affirmed if 
7The cited exhibit only states that Mel Parks "has been 
released," but does not define the term "release" nor state from 
what he had been released. Minutes of the meeting indicate that 
he was removed as trustee. The minutes reflect that the 
Association later attempted to characterize the action as only 
removing him as chairman, apparently in recognition of the fact 
that the trustees have no power to remove one of their number. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-6-35 (1973). 
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there is a substantial basis in the record supporting the trial 
court's findings. The record in this matter clearly supports 
the findings of the trial court, for the claims of the plaintiffs 
were without basis in fact or law. Plaintiffs' appeal of this 
matter is similarly frivolous, and defendants should be awarded 
their attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs' claims were based predominantly on allegations 
of slander. Plaintiffs failed, however, to present any evidence 
that any statements made by any of the defendants were false, 
and there was evidence from which the court properly concluded 
that the statements were true. Even if the statements were 
false, the occasions on which they were alleged to have been 
made were privileged occasions, and the trial court properly 
concluded that the privileges were not abused. Plaintiffs 
likewise failed to offer any competent evidence that the 
defendants had intentionally interfered with the business of 
Formen and the evidence of damages which was offered was so 
speculative and lacking in foundation as to not be worthy 
of consideration. 
A review of the entire record reveals substantial support 
for the trial court's finding that plaintiffs brought this action 
for the primary purpose of preventing the defendants from 
investigating and preserving their legal rights. The trial court 
therefore properly concluded that the action was without merit 
and brought in bad faith, and the court's award of attorney 
fees should therefore be affirmed. 
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The record contains competent evidence supporting the trial 
court's finding that the parties to the joint venture dissolution 
agreement intended to effect an equal division of the joint 
venture assets. The trial court's decree of reformation, 
effecting such an equal division, was therefore proper. 
The trial court's grant of summary judgment rescinding 
certain contracts of purchase and awarding a refund of purchase 
monies was supported by undisputed evidence that Formen made a 
false statement of a material fact in connection with the sales. 
Plaintiffs did not present any evidence of conspiracy, nor 
of any improper contacts with governmental officials, and, 
therefore, did not even present a prima facie antitrust case. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 
evidentiary rulings. With plaintiffs, and equally so with 
defendants, the court restricted direct examination to only 




THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS SUPPORTED 
BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE THAT PLAINTIFFS• 
ACTION WAS WITHOUT MERIT AND WAS NOT ASSERTED 
IN GOOD FAITH. 
A. The Plaintiffs1 Action Was Without Merit. 
The trial court awarded the defendants a portion8 of the 
attorneys fees they had incurred as a sanction for the plaintiffs 
defendants claimed and presented evidence to support 
attorney's fees of $51,769.75, plus costs. The court only 
awarded the defendants a total of $3 0,000.00, plus costs. 
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having brought and asserted this action in bad faith. The basis 
for the court's action was Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (Supp. 
1983), which permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party "if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith." 
This Court has recently held that the first element of this 
statute, that the action be without merit, is satisfied if the 
action is "of little weight or importance having no basis in law 
or fact." Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
Plaintiffs attempt to establish that their case had a basis in 
law or fact by claiming that the evidence at trial established 
five "propositions." Plaintiffs' Brief 22-23. Each of these 
five "propositions" will be treated in order: 
1. That the Defendants expressed an intent 
to damage the Plaintiffs. [Plaintiffs' 
Brief 22]. 
Plaintiffs did testify that Mel Parks had expressed an 
intent to compete with Fred Smith and put him out of business 
(Tr. 247) , and that Del Taylor had stated that he had a "fate 
worse than death" in store for Fred Smith. (Tr. 74, 306). The 
trial court did not find these statements to be believable 
evidence of malice. (R. 1793). There was no evidence that any 
of the twelve other defendants expressed any intent of any nature 
with respect to the plaintiffs. 
Even if the above statements were made, however, they would 
not have been actionable. An intent to compete, or a competitive 
act, even if coupled with an intent to put another out of 
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the business, is not actionable unless improper methods are 
used. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 
(Utah 1982) . The remainder of this brief demonstrates the lack 
of any competent evidence of improper methods by Mel Parks or 
Del Taylor. 
The statement described to Del Taylor, if made at all, was 
made in the heat of a discussion concerning the Association's 
wrongful attempt to remove Mel Parks as a trustee (Tr. 306), and 
was therefore privileged. See Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 
1278 (Utah 1983) ; see also 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander 
§ 211 (1970). In addition, the statement contemplates some sort 
of future action. Where the statement was allegedly made only 
days before the filing of the initial complaint, and therefore 
after the claimed tortious acts, the statement was not evidence 
that Del Taylor had acted with malice in doing the acts alleged 
in the complaint. 
2. That the Defendants made numerous 
statements to third persons to the effect 
that Plaintiffs were crooks, cheats and 
liars. [Plaintiffs1 Brief 23]. 
These alleged statements are treated in detail in Point III 
of this Brief. In summary, these statements, even if made, were 
only ascribed to Mel Parks (Tr. 305), Bryce Averill (Tr. 530), 
and Jean Reid (Tr. 529). See Appendix "A". The trial court 
found that none of the defendants made any defamatory statements 
concerning the plaintiffs. (R. 1973) Even if the statements had 
been made, they were privileged and clearly not actionable. 
Finally, even if some of the statements were actionable, 
the complaint as drafted was without a basis in fact or law, 
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where it alleged that each of the defendants made each of the 
alleged defamatory statements to most existing and every 
potential purchaser of property, causing at least $6,000,000 in 
damage to plaintiffs. 
3. That the Defendants tried to take 
Plaintiffs' customers. [Plaintiffs1 Brief 
23] . 
The only evidence cited in plaintiffs' statement of facts 
to which this statement could refer is the claim that Mel Parks 
expressed an intent to put Formen out of business. (Plaintiffs' 
Brief 8, citing Tr. 247). Plaintiffs have not cited any evidence 
that any of the defendants actually did anything in an attempt 
to take any of plaintiffs' customers.9 Even had such events 
occurred, they would not have been actionable unless an intent 
to harm the plaintiffs had predominated over any competitive 
purpose. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 307 
(Utah 1982). 
4. That the Defendants contacted numerous 
regulatory and governmental bodies seeking 
sanctions against the Plaintiffs, all of 
which were found to be without merit as 
no sanctions were sought or enforced. 
[Plaintiffs' Brief 23]. 
Nowhere in plaintiffs' brief is there any citation to any 
record evidence which would support this assertion, nor was any 
evidence presented at trial which would support this assertion. 
There was testimony that Mrs. Reid had registered a complaint 
9Fred Smith did testify, although this is not referred to 
by plaintiffs in their brief, that Mel Parks did sell a lot to a 
Mr. Bird, a former purchaser from Formen, in the summer of 
1982. There was no testimony as to why Mr. Bird stopped 
purchasing his lot from Formen, as to how Mel Parks arranged 
the sale to Mr. Bird, nor of the terms of sale. (T. 296). 
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with the Department of Business Regulation, and that the 
department did not impose any sanctions against Formen. (Tr. 
591-593) . Such a complaint would be actionable only if it were 
a total sham, see cases cited in Point VI herein, and there was 
no evidence which would justify such a conclusion. 
5. That Plaintiffs [sic] sales substantially 
decreased commencing at a time when the 
slander started and substantially increased 
immediately after the issuance of the 
injunction. [Plaintiffs1 Brief 23]. 
Plaintiffs1 failure to proffer competent, believable 
evidence of damages is treated in detail in Point 11(B) of this 
Brief. The injunction in question was in effect for only 14 
days, and was not in effect during the time when plaintiffs1 
sales increased. There were numerous factors which could have 
affected the sales of Formen, and no evidence that any actions 
by the plaintiffs had any appreciable effect on these sales. 
The ultimate indication that plaintiffs1 claims were 
without basis in law or in fact is that plaintiffs were unable 
after three days of trial to present any competent, believable 
evidence to support their claims, and the court therefore 
dismissed their case. The trial court's determination that the 
case was without merit has substantial support in the record, and 
should therefore be affirmed by this Court. 
Other courts, in similar situations, have held that an 
award of attorney's fees is proper. For example, in Joiner v. 
Downey, 383 So. 2d 93 (La. App. 1980), a real estate broker had 
brought a defamation action claiming that an attorney had made 
certain objectionable statements. The trial court granted a 
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directed verdict in a jury trial, and also awarded the defendant 
his attorney's fees. .The appellate court affirmed the decision, 
noting that the plaintiff had proved only one of the several 
elements required to establish a prima facie case for slander. 
Similarly, in Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham and Co., 
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), afffd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d 
Cir. 1985), a broker brought an action against his brokerage firm 
and its attorney for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
defamation, fraud on the court and emotional distress. The claim 
arose out of an arbitration proceeding which had been brought by 
the brokerage firm against the broker. The broker based his 
claim on, among other things, an allegation that one of the 
employees of the brokerage firm had stated to the broker, when 
the broker decided to leave the firm, that the broker would be 
sued for certain monies lost during the course of his employment. 
All of the broker's claims were eventually dismissed by the 
court, and the defendants brought a motion for attorney's fees. 
The court noted that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provided for awards of attorney fees against both the 
offending plaintiff and his attorney, and also noted that this 
power was inherent in the court. The court found the complaint 
to have been totally without merit and brought in bad faith and 
assessed attorney's fees against both plaintiff and his attorney. 
On an appeal taken by the attorney, the Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court, and in addition assessed double costs and 
damages against the attorney for the frivolous appeal. 757 F.2d 
at 466. 
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B. The Plaintiffs' Action Was Brought and Maintained in 
Bad Faith. 
The trial court's conclusion that this action was brought 
in bad faith was supported by the following specific findings 
(R. 1795) : 
20. The plaintiffs' case was without merit 
and was lacking in good faith. 
21. The plaintiffs intended by this lawsuit 
to take advantage of the defendants and to 
hinder and delay the defendants in their 
investigation of their rights under the law. 
22. The plaintiffs' use of the legal process 
in their claim for millions of dollars and 
in their excessive discovery efforts was 
done to prevent the defendants from enjoying 
the use of their property and from their use 
of the legal process, and constituted 
harassment. 
23. The plaintiffs used the legal process 
for the purpose of frightening the 
defendants. Bad faith was exhibited in the 
filing of the complaint and the causes of 
action alleged and in the method of 
prosecution. 
24. The plaintiffs abused the court 
processes, in obtaining the restraining 
order and the injunction, and through 
excessive discovery proceedings, and in 
presenting frivolous and meaningless, time 
consuming evidence and testimony. 
25. The defendants, at most, undertook to 
make reasonable inquiries concerning their 
rights as property owners in the joint 
venture and as subdivision owners. 
26. The plaintiffs brought and maintained 
this action in bad faith. 
The determination of whether the plaintiffs acted in bad 
faith presented a factual question for the trial court. Comment, 
Attorney's Fees in Bad Faith, Meritless Actions, 1984 Utah L. 
Rev. 593, 602. The court's findings must be af finned if 
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supported by competent evidence. Id. In order to challenge the 
trial court's findings, the burden was on the plaintiffs to 
marshal all the evidence supporting the findings, and to demon-
strate that it was not sufficient. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiffs have not made any attempt to marshal the evidence 
in support of the trial court's decision, but have only presented 
the evidence supporting their position. Such a one-sided 
presentation was criticized by this Court in Hobbs v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western Railroad, 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1984). 
The record before this Court clearly contains evidence of 
bad faith; in fact, the evidence compels a finding of bad faith 
as a matter of law. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149 (Utah 1983), 
established that bad faith exists if any one of the following 
three factors is lacking: 
(1) An honest belief in the propriety of 
the activities in question; 
(2) No intention to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and 
(3) No intent to, or knowledge of the fact 
that the activities in question will, 
hinder, delay, or defraud others. 
671 P.2d at 151 (citation omitted). 
The evidence clearly supports a finding that the plaintiffs 
did not have an honest belief in the allegations of their 
complaint, and therefore did not have an honest belief in the 
propriety of their litigation. The amended complaint purports 
to cover the period from June 1, 1982, through April 22, 1983, 
and claims damages for "approximately 100 contracts to date 
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which have terminated" and for "lost sales of approximately 200 
lots" during that period by reason of the activities of the 
defendants. (R. 921-22). The initial complaint, filed January 
19, 1983, and therefore covering a shorter time period, contained 
the same allegation. (R. 7). 
The evidence at trial, however, established only 53 
cancellations, from all causes, during the relevant time period. 
(Schedule 3.12 and 3.13 of Ex. 46). Plaintiffs presented 
evidence of only three contracts which plaintiffs claim were 
cancelled during the relevant time by reason of the activities 
of any of the defendants. (Tr. 314-315, 435, 550). In addition, 
the complaint contains grossly overbroad allegations to the 
effect that each of the defendants had contacted "most of the 
contract buyers" in Hideaway and had also contacted "every 
potential customer of the plaintiffs" during the relevant time 
period, and that each of the defendants had stated and done, to 
or with respect to each potential or existing customer, all of 
the statements and acts alleged in the complaint. (R. 915-21). 
Formen1s sales records were computerized and Formen 
therefore presumably had rapid access to accurate information 
concerning the status of its sales. (Tr. 268). Fred Smith, 
Formenfs president, testified that he kept abreast of the 
status of the sales, and inquired concerning the cause of nearly 
every cancellation. (Tr. 267, 282-83). It is therefore 
inconceivable that plaintiffs could have had an honest belief in 
the false and grossly overstated allegations of their complaint. 
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The complaint also alleged, as an essential and primary 
allegation of plaintiffs' claim of antitrust violations, that 
the defendants had made or attempted to make below-cost sales of 
lots in an effort to unfairly compete with plaintiffs. (R. 
932). Plaintiffs offered absolutely no evidence, however, to 
support this allegation. Pre-trial discovery revealed no 
evidence to support this allegation. (See, e.g., R. 613-15). 
In fact, plaintiffs offered evidence of only one sale having been 
made by only one defendant, and the evidence on that subject was 
hearsay. There was no evidence concerning the terms of the sale 
and no claim that the sale was made below cost. (Tr. 296). 
It is likewise difficult to conceive how plaintiffs could 
have had an honest belief in the allegations of their Fifth 
Cause of Action, which implicitly alleged that Mel Parks had a 
duty, as president of the Association, to maintain the roads in 
the subdivision, and that he had intentionally shirked his duty 
with the intent that the bad condition of the roads would hinder 
Formenfs sales. (R. 918-20, 930). The Fifth Cause of Action 
further alleges that Mel Parks intentionally caused trucks 
loaded with gravel to be driven over the roads when they were 
wet, thereby damaging the roads, all with the intent and purpose 
to hinder Formen's sales. (Id.) Plaintiffs did not even 
attempt to offer any evidence at trial in support of these 
ridiculous claims. 
Aside from the serious lack of a basis in fact for the 
allegations of the complaint, the trial court properly concluded 
that plaintiffs did not have an honest belief that the statements 
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and actions alleged to have been said and done by defendants 
were actionable. As is set forth in Point VI herein, attempts to 
influence governmental agencies are actionable only if they are a 
complete sham. In addition, as is set forth in Point III of this 
Brief, the statements alleged to have been made by defendants 
would have been actionable only if they were actually false, and 
were known by the defendants to be false (actual or constitu-
tional malice standard). The burden is on the plaintiff to 
establish falsity. Direct Import Buyer's Association v. KSL, 
Inc. , 538 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1975). The plaintiffs did not 
offer any evidence on either issue, but there was evidence from 
which the court properly concluded that the statements and 
activities which gave rise to this litigation were made in the 
context of a property owner's association, and constituted a good 
faith attempt on the part of the homeowners to determine the 
nature and extent of their own rights. There is no indication 
that plaintiffs ever had a good faith belief that the defendants 
intentionally made false statements while knowing them to be 
false. 
Evidence that the plaintiffs intended to take unconscionable 
advantage of the defendants is found in the allegations of the 
complaint itself, read in conjunction with the knowledge which 
the plaintiffs had concerning the individual defendants. The 
complaint alleges wildly speculative damages in excess of 
$18,000,000. (R. 933). There was evidence that the plaintiffs, 
having sold property to several of the defendants and knowing of 
their difficulty in making payments, knew that most of the 
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individual defendants could not even afford to hire legal 
counsel, to say nothing of their obvious inability to even begin 
making payments on such a massive judgment. (Tr. 900, 903-04). 
In addition, immediately after filing the complaint, the 
plaintiffs embarked on a systematic attempt to smother the 
defendants with a barrage of discovery activity, including 
11-hour depositions and 500-question sets of interrogatories. 
(Tr. 873-74; R. 791, 353-504). The prayer for millions of 
dollars and the oppressive discovery activities provide ample 
basis for the trial court's findings that the plaintiffs were 
harassing the defendants and attempting to prevent the defendants 
from enjoying the use of their property and from meaningful 
access as to the legal process. Bad faith may be found both in 
the filing of the complaint itself, and in the method of 
prosecution. Where a party "unreasonably and vexatiously" abuses 
court processes, including discovery privileges, an award of 
attorney's fees is appropriate. Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris 
Upham and Co. , Inc. , 579 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D. N.Y. 1984), 
aff'd, 757 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1985). 
Finally, the evidence supported the trial court's finding 
that this action was filed with the intent of hindering or 
delaying the defendants in the pursuit of their legal rights. 
Many of the allegations in the complaint are devoted to 
challenging the defendants' activities in contacting various 
governmental entities, and to challenging the defendants' 
discussions and communications with other property owners 
concerning the plaintiffs' actions. These communications by the 
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defendants, if they occurred, were clearly constitutionally 
protected and privileged, as is set forth in Points III and VI of 
this Brief. Yet the plaintiffs conducted this litigation in such 
a manner as to hinder or delay the defendants' exercise of these 
rights. In addition to the frightening prayer for judgment and 
the oppressive discovery tactics outlined above, the very timing 
of the complaint itself evidenced an intent to hinder the defen-
dants in the exercise of their legal rights. The complaint 
was filed only days after some of the defendants had made a call 
for an annual Association meeting to discuss and air, in a proper 
forum, the various problems that those defendants felt existed. 
(Ex. 35; R. 1). Contemporaneously with the filing of the 
complaint, however, the plaintiffs sought and obtained a 
temporary restraining order (R. 70-73) which, even though it was 
later found to be unsupportable (R. 74-76) , had the effect of 
preventing any meaningful discussion of the problems at the 
Association meeting. 
As is set forth above, there is ample support in the record 
for the trial court's award of attorney's fees. Evidence of the 
lack of any one of the elements of good faith listed in Cady is 
sufficient; defendants established the lack of all three. The 
award should therefore be affirmed. 
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POINT II 
THE JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WAS SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
A. The Trial Court On A Motion To Dismiss May Weigh Or 
Reject The Evidence, And The Trial Court's Findings 
Should Be Upheld If Supported By Competent Evidence. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b) permits the court, in a non-jury 
action, to dismiss the case at the close of the plaintiff's case 
if the plaintiff has not made a persuasive showing of his right 
for relief. The purpose of this rule is to permit the trial 
court to weigh the evidence and to dismiss the case if the court 
has not been persuaded that the plaintiff is entitled to recover. 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co. , 15 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, 37 
(1985) (citations omitted). "The trial court is not precluded 
from granting such a motion merely because the plaintiff has 
made out a prima facie case . . . ." Id. The plaintiff's 
evidence will generally be uncontroverted on a Rule 41(b) 
motion, because the defendant has not yet presented his case. 
The court may nonetheless reject the plaintiff's evidence if the 
witnesses are unbelievable or the evidence otherwise 
insufficient. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 311 (Utah 1983). 
No inferences in favor of the plaintiff, nor presumptions 
in favor of continuing through the entire trial, should be 
indulged. Keenan v. Brooks, 100 Idaho 823, 606 P.2d 473, 475 
(1980). The logical basis for this rule is clear: where the 
judge is the trier of fact and the judge has not been persuaded 
that the plaintiff's case has merit, requiring the defendant to 
present evidence to further discredit the plaintiff's case 
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would be a waste of time. Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308, 311 
(Utah 1983) (citation omitted). 
On appeal, the findings and judgment of the trial court are 
accorded the same presumption of correctness as if the entire 
presentation of both sides had been heard: 
When the court has made findings and 
entered judgment thereon as was done here, 
it is then our duty to review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the findings, 
and they must be allowed to stand if 
reasonable minds could agree with them. 
Likewise every reasonable intendment ought 
to be indulged in favor of the validity and 
correctness of the judgment under review, 
and it will not be disturbed unless the 
appellant meets his burden of affirmatively 
showing error. 
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Co. , 3 Utah 2d 247, 250-51, 282 
P.2d 335, 337 (1955). 
A party challenging the findings has the burden to "marshal 
all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and 
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most favorable 
to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). 
Plaintiffs argue, however, that the trial court, in 
considering a motion to dismiss made at the close of the 
plaintiffs1 evidence, must view all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs and may grant the motion only if the 
plaintiffs have wholly failed to establish a prima facie case. 
(Plaintiffs1 Brief at 24-25). This rule might apply if this 
were a jury case. Plaintiffs assertion of such a rule in this 
non-jury case, however, is totally without merit, and the cases 
26 
cited by plaintiffs are uniformly unsupportive of plaintiffs1 
position. 
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance 
Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 685 (1965), involved 
a summary judgment for the defendant granted at a pre-trial 
conference, where no motion for summary judgment had been filed. 
Asotin County Port District v. Clarkston Community Corp., 73 
Wash. 2d 72, 436 P.2d 470 (1968), was a condemnation action in 
which the trial court had denied a motion to dismiss. The rule 
cited by the instant plaintiffs is a quote from Coffman v. 
McFadden, 68 Wash. 2d 954, 958, 416 P.2d 99 (1966), a jury case. 
In non-jury cases, Washington follows the same rule as does Utah. 
Wash. Civ. R. 41(b)(3); Roy v. Goerz, 26 Wash. App. 807, 614 P.2d 
1308, 1310 (1980), overruled on other grounds, Chaplin v. 
Sanders, 100 Wash. 2d 853, 676 P.2d 431, 436 (1984). 
Christensen v. Stuchlik, 91 Idaho 504, 427 P.2d 278 (1967); 
Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983), and Campbell v. 
General Motors Corp.. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. 
Rptr. 891 (1982), are all jury cases. Furthermore, the rule 
from Christensen even as stated by the instant plaintiffs 
expressly applies only to jury cases, and a footnote to that case 
emphasizes that a wholly different rule applies in non-jury 
cases. 427 P.2d at 220 n.l. California similarly applies the 
same rule as does Utah in non-jury cases. Canales v. City of 
Alviso, 3 Cal. 3d 118, 474 P.2d 417, 89 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1970). 
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B. The Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Finding That 
Defendants Did Not Intentionally And Tortiously 
Interfere With Formen's Business. 
Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action alleges that the defen-
dants tortiously interfered with Formen's existing and potential 
economic relations. (R. 913-22). To establish a case for 
interference with existing contracts, Formen was required to 
prove conduct on the part of each defendant which "intentionally 
and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract 
. . . between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise 
causing the third person not to perform the contract . . . ." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (197 9). The elements of a 
cause of action for intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations are similar. For either tort, Formen was 
required to prove, with respect to each defendant, "(1) that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing 
or potential economic relations; (2) for an improper purpose or 
by improper means; (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). 
The last element will be addressed first. This element 
essentially has two parts, causation and damages. The trial 
court specifically found: 
9. There was no credible or believable 
evidence that any of the plaintiffs had 
suffered any special damages proximately 
caused by any of the defendants. 
10. There was no believable, credible and 
concrete evidence concerning any general 
damages. 
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11 • The evidence concerning general damages 
was too speculative to be worthy of 
consideration. 
(R. 1793). 
Formen has not challenged the evidence supportive of these 
findings, but has only referred to the evidence supportive of its 
position. As is shown below, the evidence does not compel the 
conclusion that the findings were erroneous. 
Formen claims that Mr. Sharp stopped paying on his contract 
because of rumors that were floating around, and that Formen 
thereby lost at least $10,820.40. (Plaintiffs1 Brief 9-10; Tr. 
314, 558). Plaintiffs offered no admissible evidence, however, 
as to the nature or source of the rumors. (Tr. 314). When asked 
if certain specific statements by Del Taylor had an effect on his 
decision to stop paying for his lot, Mr. Sharp could only say, 
"indirectly, I suppose it did because I was getting fed up with 
the turmoil." (Tr. 315). It was not error for the trial court 
to disregard such inconclusive testimony. 
Formen claims that Pat Mounteer and LaMar Macklin stopped 
paying for their lots because of the difficulties of serving as 
trustees and officers of the Association. Discussions among 
members of a corporation, and especially among the officers 
thereof, are qualifiedly privileged and not actionable in the 
absence of malice. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P. 2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 
1983) (citations omitted). In addition, the difficulties and 
hassles complained of occurred after the filing of the initial 
complaint herein, and the trial court could properly have 
concluded that the disarray in the Association was as much the 
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result of plaintiffs having brought the suit as of any 
independent actions by defendants. 
Formen claims that Leslie Wallace Roach terminated his 
contract as a result of his receipt of Exhibit 3 5 and other 
similar correspondence in the mail. (Plaintiffs1 Brief 12; Tr. 
434) . There was no evidence presented at trial or in any 
pre-trial discovery that any of the defendants had sent any prior 
correspondence to Mr. Roach. It would be reasonable to assume 
that the "other similar correspondence" was the Pat Mounteer 
newsletter (referred to in Exhibit 35) and the Association 
assessment (Tr. 110-12). Aside from the issue of whether 
defendants1 mailing of Exhibit 35 was improper, therefore, 
the trial court properly determined that Roach's cancellation was 
not caused by the defendants. 
Formen also claims that its sales figures demonstrated the 
effect of defendants1 activities, and points to low sales during 
the last half of 1982 followed by an increase commencing with 
February, 1983. Formen asserts that the low sales are 
attributable to defendants1 alleged defamation of Formen, and 
that the increase occurred as a result of the trial court having 
entered an injunction against further statements by defendants. 
The fallacy with this "evidence" is that the injunction referred 
to10 expired February 2, 1983, prior to the time of the increase 
in sales, and after having been in effect only 14 days (R. 70-73, 
10There was a subsequent limited injunction in effect 
against Del Taylor from May 4, 1983, until the time of trial. 
(R. 685-87). This injunction similarly does not explain the 
increase in sales occurring in February, 1983. 
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74-76). In addition, the sales for the first part of 1982, 
prior to the alleged slander, followed the same pattern. (See 
Plaintiffs' Brief 13). 
Finally, Formen points to the economic analysis performed 
by Mr. Frank Stuart, an accountant. Mr. Stuart projected 
damages of $3,600,000. (Tr. 401). Mr. Stuart admitted, however, 
that Formen fs past sales record of only one year was not long 
enough to allow a statistically meaningful projection into the 
future. (Tr. 432-33). Mr. Stuart also assumed, without 
foundation in the evidence, that lot sales would have remained 
constant at 161 lots per year (the average of sales for 1980 and 
1981) for a period of 10 years (Tr. 381), even though there were 
only 452 lots in the subdivision (Tr. 602), more than half of 
which had already been sold (R. 915) . Mr. Stuart further 
assumed that the effects of the alleged disparagement would 
follow Formen with a constant effect wherever Formen did 
business. (Tr. 411-12) . (At the time of trial, Formen was 
engaged in land development in St. George, Utah. (Tr. 428).) 
Numerous other deficiencies of Mr. Stuart's projection were 
revealed on cross-examination. (Tr. 413-25). The trial court 
properly rejected the evidence as "too speculative to be worthy 
of consideration." (R. 1793; Tr. 706-07). 
The first and second elements set forth in Leigh were 
similarly not established. The first element requires proof of 
intentional interference. The trial court specifically found 
that none of the defendants intentionally interfered with any of 
the existing or potential contracts or economic relations of the 
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plaintiffs. (R. 1793). Plaintiffs have not challenged this 
finding at all, let alone with the marshalling approach required 
by Scharf, supra. A review of the record reveals, however, that 
the evidence supports the finding that defendants did not 
interfere with Formen1s business, and that if they did interfere, 
the interference was not intentional. 
The evidence similarly justified a finding that even if 
some of the defendants did intentionally interfere with Formenfs 
economic relations, they did not do so with an improper purpose 
or by improper means. The "improper means" claimed by Formen 
is defamation. This claim is addressed in Point III of this 
Brief. 
The only claimed evidence of improper purpose is the 
alleged statement of Mel Parks that he was going to put Formen 
out of business, and the alleged statement of Del Taylor that he 
had a "fate worse than death" in store for Fred Smith. The 
infirmities of this evidence are demonstrated above in Point I. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM 
FOR SLANDER WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The second, third, and fourth causes of action of plaintiffs 
amended complaint allege that the defendants all made certain 
allegedly defamatory statements concerning Fred Smith, Don 
Skipworth and Formen Corporation. 
To establish a cause of action for defamation, plaintiffs 
were required to prove "four essential elements: falsity, an 
unprivileged communication, fault, and damages." Mark v. 
32 
Seattle Times, 96 Wash, 2d 473, 635 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1981), 
cert, denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982). See also Direct Import 
Buyer's Association v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1975) 
(plaintiff required to "prove falsity of the statements made, 
malice, and special damages").11 Plaintiffs, however, as it set 
forth below, failed to present evidence concerning each of the 
elements required, and thus, failed to establish even a prima 
facie case of defamation. Even if plaintiffs were held to have 
established a prima facie case, the trial court was nonetheless 
justified, based on the evidence presented, in finding for the 
defendants. 
Plaintiffs1 Brief refers12 to the evidence presented at 
trial concerning statements allegedly made by the defendants 
remaining in the action at trial13 to persons other than the 
nThe tort of defamation has sigificantly changed during 
recent years, and continues to change, as a result of several 
Supreme Court decisions exploring the perimeters of the freedom 
of speech. The above four elements seem well settled, however, 
with the ongoing changes occurring only with respect to the 
degree of fault required. The development of defamation law is 
analyzed in greater detail in defendants1 Trial Brief filed 
herein. (R. 1660-97). See also Van Dvke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 
54-55 (Utah 1983). 
12Because the burden was on plaintiffs to marshal the 
evidence in support of their claims, Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985), defendants will address only the 
evidence referred to by plaintiffs in their Brief. A review of 
all of the evidence presented at trial would not, however, 
change the result. 
13Pre-trial discovery revealed that plaintiffs did not have 
even a colorable claim against defendants Nasky Joint Venture, 
Nancy Taylor, Jerry Parks, Starla Mayers, or Wanda Hopper, and 
the Court therefore granted summary judgment for those parties. 
(R. 1645-47, 1792). Plaintiffs have not challenged that grant 
of summary judgment. 
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person allegedly defamed. The evidence referred to by 
plaintiffs is set forth in Appendix "A" of this brief. 
Simply presenting testimony that the statements were made 
did not, however, establish a prima facie case. Plaintiffs had 
the affirmative burden of proving that the statements were false. 
Nevada Broadcasting Corp. v. Allen, 664 P.2d 337, 343 (Nev. 
1983); Direct Import Buyer's Association v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 
1040, 1042 (Utah, 1975); Himango v. Prime Time Broadcasting, 
Inc. , 37 Wash. App. 259, 680 P.2d 432, 436 (1984). Plaintiffs 
wholly failed to present any evidence that any of the alleged 
statements were false, and therefore must be held to have failed 
to present a prima facie case. 
Even if plaintiffs had presented some evidence that the 
statements were false, however, there was evidence from which 
the trial court could nonetheless have found that many of the 
statements were true. Truth of the statements made is, of 
course, an absolute defense to an action for defamation. Ogden 
Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., 551 P.2d 222, 224 (Utah 1975) (citations 
omitted). 
The evidence established as a matter of a law that Formen, 
and therefore its officers, had lied to prospective purchasers 
(including several of the defendants) by stating that there were 
no encumbrances against the property, when in fact there was an 
approximately one-half million dollar lien against the land. 
(Tr. 146-47, 160-61; R. 1733-35). The evidence supported a 
finding that Formen failed to comply with Sanpete County 
regulations by developing and marketing what apparently was a 
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year-round subdivison, but which complied, at most, only with the 
less stringent requirements for a summer home subdivision• (Tr. 
118-35, 190). Formen violated the law by using an unlicensed 
salesman, Max Smith, to sell lots in the subdivision. (Tr. 608, 
612) . Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-1 (Int. Supp. 1985) . There was 
evidence that Fred Smith lied to Del Taylor and another 
individual concerning a statement which had been made to Larry 
Anderson. (Tr. 233-34). There was evidence that Formen's 
salesmen or employees had made promises to Larry Anderson 
concerning accessibility to his lot which were not kept. (Tr. 
237-38). See also page 9 herein. 
The above discussion demonstrates that the plaintiffs 
failed to prove that any of the defendants made any defamatory 
statements (i.e., there was no evidence that the statements were 
false). As is set forth below, plaintiffs similarly failed to 
establish that the statements were made with actual malice. 
The United States Supreme Court has established, through a 
series of cases which have wrestled with the inherent conflict 
between the law of defamation and the first amendment freedoms 
of speech, that a "public figure" may not maintain an action for 
defamation unless he proves that the statements were made with 
"actual malice." See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 
(1975). "Actual malice" exists only where the defendants made 
the statements knowing them to be false or had a high degree of 
awareness that the statements were probably false, and recklessly 
failed to investigate whether they were true or false. 
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Seeamiller v. KSL, Inc. 626 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 1981), citing 
St, Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
Plaintiffs, as prominent developers of property in Sanpete 
County (Tr. 244), must be considered to be "public figures" under 
"even the most restrictive definition" of that term. Greenbelt 
Publishing Association., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8-9 
(1970). See also Van Dyke v. KUTV. 663 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1983) 
(individual in position which invites public scrutiny is a 
public official). 
Even if plaintiffs were not public figures, the actual 
malice standard would still apply because the alleged defamation 
concerned matters of public interest. Although Gertz left to 
each individual state the determination of whether the actual 
malice standard would apply where non-public figures are 
plaintiffs, this Court has clearly adopted the actual malice test 
where matters of public interest and general concern are 
involved. Seeamiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 976 n. 11 (Utah 
1981). 
The subject matter of the alleged statements here, which 
concern a large and ongoing land development scheme where 
approximately one-half the lots remained to be sold, is clearly 
a matter of public interest and concern. Diversified Management, 
Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1108 (Colo. 1982). 
See also Direct Import Buyer's Association v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 
1040 (Utah 1975) (discussion of products sold to the public is a 
matter of public interest). 
Finally, even if plaintiffs were held not to be public 
figures, and the matter not to be one of public interest or 
concern, the alleged defamatory statements would still have 
been gualifiedly privileged. A qualified privilege exists when 
circumstances lead an individual with an interest in a subject 
matter to correctly or reasonably believe that another individual 
is interested or entitled to know the allegedly defamatory 
information, Hales v. Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, 114 Utah 
186, 197 P.2d 910 (1948), or where an individual makes a good 
faith statement in response to a request for information. Utah 
Code Ann. § 45-2-3(3) (1981); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-506 
(1982). 
This Court recently summarized many of the situations in 
which a qualified privilege has been held to exist as follows: 
As to the merits of this summary 
judgment, it has long been held that 
communications between persons who share a 
common business interest are qualifiedly 
privileged and not libelous in the absence 
of malice. Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahv 
Corp., 22 Wash. App. 278, 588 P.2d 1222 
(1979) where a qualified privilege protected 
allegedly libelous statements in letters a 
corporate employer had written about an 
employee with whom the employer shared a 
common business interest; Sylvester v. 
Armstrong, 53 Wyo. 382, 84 P.2d 729 (1938) 
where a letter written by a stockholder 
concerning another stockholder's conduct in 
managing the hotel corporation was found to 
be qualifiedly privileged; World Oil Co. , 
Inc. v. Hicks, Texas Civ. App., 46 S.W. 2d 
394 (1932) where a director's letter to 
stockholders in which a judgment creditor was 
called a parasite, thief, and law violator 
was held qualifiedly privileged; and, Stroud 
v. Harris, 5 F.2d 25 (1925) where a letter 
from one bondholder (and stockholder) to 
other bondholders regarding the manager of a 
corporation was held qualifiedly privileged 
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in the absence of malice. See generally 50 
Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander, §168, §270 
(1970); 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander, §109 
(1948) . 
Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983). 
Although all of the examples set forth above are very 
similar to the case at bar, of special interest is the World Oil 
Company case, where a director had written a letter to the 
stockholders referring to a creditor as a parasite, thief, and 
law violator. This is similar to the claim of the plaintiffs in 
the instant case, where trustees and the members of a non-profit 
corporation are accused of making statements, both written and 
oral, to other members or stockholders of the corporation, which 
refer to one of the other trustees as a thief, crook, and liar. 
Even if the statements were made, they are clearly qualifiedly 
privileged. 
Plaintiffs claim, however, that a qualified privilege may 
be defeated by proof of malice. (Plaintiffs1 Brief 32-33). 
Once a qualified privilege is established, however, the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving malice by clear and convincing 
evidence. See Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968 976 n.5, 
citing Williams v. Standard-Examiner Publishing- Co., 83 Utah 31, 
27 P.2d 1 (1933); Hoke v. Paul, 65 Hawaii 478, 653 P.2d 1155, 
1160 (1982), citing Medeiros v. Condof 55 Hawaii 499, 522 P.2d 
1269 (1974). Malice must be independently proved; the bare fact 
that the allegedly defamatory statements were made is not proof 
of malice. Utah Code Ann. § 45-2-4 (1981). 
With respect to most of the individual defendants who were 
alleged to have made defamatory statements, plaintiffs did not 
even attempt to offer proof of malice.14 The only statements 
which plaintiffs claim show malice, those made by Mel Parks and 
Del Taylor, have been previously discussed. (See pages 13-14 
herein). The trial court specifically found that "[n]one of the 
defendants acted with malice toward any of the plaintiffs". (R. 
1793). The finding is supported by competent evidence and must 
be affinned. 
POINT IV 
THE DECREE OF REFORMATION WAS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
This Court recently set forth the grounds for a decree of 
reformation as follows: 
Reformation of a deed is a proceeding 
in equity and is appropriate where the terms 
of the written instrument are mistaken in 
that they do not show the true intent of the 
agreement between the parties. There are 
two grounds for reformation of such an 
agreement: mutual mistake of the parties 
and ignorance or mistake by one party, 
coupled with fraud by the other party. 
Hottinaer v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984). 
The trial court made the following findings: 
14. It was the intention of the parties to 
the "Memorandum of Partnership dissolution 
Agreement" (hereinafter "dissolution 
agreement") to effect an equal division of 
the joint venture or partnership assets. 
14Plaintiffs claim, on page 32 of their Brief, that the 
conditional privilege was abused because some of the statements 
were made at meetings where Arlon Fox, Jim Norlander, and 
numerous other non-owner individuals were present. There is 
absolutely no evidence in the trial transcript which supports 
this assertion. 
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16. The water as well as the land was an 
asset of the joint venture. 
18. The failure of the dissolution agree-
ment to explicitly list water as an asset and 
to explicitly provide for the division of the 
water was due to the mutual mistake of the 
parties. 
19. The parties to the dissolution agreement 
intended that Parks Enterprises, Inc., would 
receive, as part of its equal share of the 
joint venture assets and without additional 
or separate cost to Parks Enterprises, Inc., 
the water necessary for the lots received 
by Parks Enterprises, Inc., under the 
dissolution agreement, and that the water 
would be provided in the same proportion as 
had been furnished, or had been contracted to 
be furnished, for other lots heretofore 
sold. 
R. 1794-95. 
Support for these findings is found in the testimony of 
defendants that they understood that water was an asset of the 
joint venture, and was part of Formen's contribution to the joint 
venture. (Tr. 765, 779) . Defendants further testified that they 
understood and intended that the dissolution agreement was to 
effect an equal division of the joint venture assets. (Tr. 832). 
Finally, Fred Smith admitted that he had understood and intended 
that the dissolution agreement would effect an equal division of 
the assets, with Parks Enterprises receiving water rights as part 
of their share of the assets. (Tr. 758-59, 800-01). Where the 
trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence such 
as this, the findings and decree of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
The mutual mistake of the parties is also evident from an 
analysis of the documents themselves. Under the initial joint 
venture agreement (Ex. 1) , Formen had the obligation to provide 
water for the lots, without cost to Parks Enterprises, as part of 
its contribution to the joint venture. This obligation was 
reinforced by the provisions to the protective covenants for 
Elkridge Ranches and for Hideaway Valley, which also obligated 
Formen Corporation to provide water to the property owners. (Ex. 
64) . 
The documents likewise evidence that the parties intended 
that the same obligation (i.e., that Formen would provide water 
for the lots without costs to Parks Enterprises) would continue 
under the dissolution agreement. In determining what was the 
intent of the parties, this Court should look at the agreement 
itself, and also to the circumstances, nature, and purposes of 
the contract. Utah State Medical Assoc, v. Utah State Employee's 
Credit Union, 655 P.2d 643 (Utah 1982); Nixon & Nixon, Inc. v. 
John New and Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982). 
The dissolution agreement itself states, in paragraph 3.1, 
that its purpose was to effect an equal division of the joint 
venture assets. Water was understood by all parties to be a 
necessary asset of the joint venture. The joint venture 
agreement explicitly so states. (Ex. 1, P. 2). The applicable 
county laws also required that property not be sold without water 
(Ex. 19, p. 14), and those laws are an implicit part of every 
contract. Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Industrial 
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Commission, 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978); Quagliana v. Exquisite 
Homebuilders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). 
The primary objection of Formen to the trial court's decree 
appears to be not with the requirement that Formen provide 
water, but with the requirement that it do so without cost to 
Parks Enterprises. Formen!s contention is based on two clauses 
of the joint venture agreement (Ex. 1), which provide as follows: 
[Section II: Contributions] 
In addition, it is understood that 
Formen has acquired the needed water rights 
required to develop the tract and sell the 
same in subdivided parcels. Parties agree 
that said water is essential to the intent 
of this agreement. Title to said water, 
however, is subject to the completion of a 
purchase contract by Formen from the Rennert 
Investment Company, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
Formen agrees to provide water rights to the 
parcels as they are sold on an "as needed11 
basis and further agrees to indemnify and 
hold Parks harmless from any liabilities 
resulting from the insufficiency of providing 
such water for the tract or any parcel 
thereof. In the event that Formen defaults 
under the terms of this agreement or in the 
event this venture shall not be completed or 
terminated short of its time, Formen does 
hereby grant to Parks the right to assume 
their position in the purchase contract with 
Rennert wherein Parks will acquire the water 
rights by completing the payments of the 
contract, said payments not to exceed the 
original purchase price of $75,000.00. 
[Section IX: Termination] 
In the event of termination of this 
Agreement, all liabilities of the joint 
venture shall be paid and all unsold parcels 
and those held in default of sales contracts 
shall be distributed to Parks by the trustee 
holding title to the same. Parks shall have 
the right to acquire the water rights 
pertaining to the said parcels at a price 
equal to Formenfs cost. 
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Initially, it should be noted that these provisions were 
superseded and cancelled by the express provisions of paragraph 
4 of the dissolution agreement. Even if that were not the case, 
however, it is obvious that these provisions were only intended 
to apply if Formen Corporation went bankrupt or was otherwise 
unable to perform its obligation under the joint venture, and 
Parks Enterprises was therefore required to step in and take 
over the entire project. If these provisions were to be applied 
to the equal split of the joint venture, as advocated by Formen, 
a truly anomalous result would obtain. Parks Enterprises would 
be entitled to purchase all the water for the subdivision by 
paying the remaining balance of the $75,000 purchase price. 
Parks Enterprises would have no obligation to give Formen 
any water at any price. Formen, however, would nonetheless be 
obligated by the terms of the protective covenants to provide the 
necessary water to each of the lots. This result is obviously 
foolish and it is evident the parties did not intend the above 
provisions to apply to an equal split of the joint venture. See 
Dickson v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. , 77 Wash. 2d 
785, 466 P.2d 515, 518 (1970) (reasonable construction of 
contract will be adopted). 
The trial court did not, therefore, make a new contract for 
the parties, but merely reformed the existing contract to 
reflect what the parties had intended. There is competent 
evidence in the record in support of the trial court's findings 
concerning mutual mistake and the intent of the parties, and the 
decree of reformation must therefore be affirmed. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR THE FORECLOSURE DEFENDANTS. 
On Page 39 of their Brief, plaintiffs withdraw their 
objection to the decree of summary judgment entered in favor of 
defendants Reids and Averill, and limit their appeal solely to 
the summary judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Huffaker. 
The summary judgment in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Huf faker (R. 
1733-35) was based on Utah Code Ann. § 57-11-17 (1974), which 
provids that if a developer makes an untrue statement of a 
material fact in connection with the sale of subdivided lands, 
the purchaser is entitled to recover the consideration paid for 
the land together with interest, property taxes paid, costs, 
and reasonable attorney's fees. Undisputed evidence offered in 
connection with the foreclosure defendants1 motion for summary 
judgment established that Formen had represented to prospective 
purchasers such as Huffakers that there were no encumbrances 
against the Hideaway Valley property. (R. 1283). In actual 
fact, however, there existed an obligation of approximately 
one-half million dollars against the property. (R. 1290, 12 68). 
Formen made no attempt to rebut this evidence. (R. 1370-77). 
See Utah Dist. Ct. & Cir. Ct. R. Prac. 2.8(e) (unrebutted facts 
are deemed admitted for purposes of summary judgment). 
Plaintiffs now claim, on page 39 of their Brief, that 
ff[t]here is clearly an issue of fact as to whether developers 
made an untrue statement." Plaintiffs do not, however, identify 
the nature of this supposed issue of fact, nor cite to any 
evidence in the record which would have raised an issue of fact. 
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Plaintiffs also claim that there is a question of "fact" 
concerning the applicable statute of limitations. No such issue 
was raised before the trial court. See, e.g. , Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 16 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 25 (Utah 1985) (issues not raised 
before trial court will not be considered for first time on 
appeal). In any event, an action under Utah Code Ann. § 57-11-17 
may, pursuant to the express provisions of subdivision (6) of 
that section, be brought anytime within 4 years after the 
first payment of money to the subdivider in the contested 
action. Huffakers purchased their lot on or about April 18, 
1981. (R. 1269). Their counterclaim was filed October 28, 
1983. (R. 1196). The action was clearly timely. 
Finally, plaintiffs also claim that ff[t]here is a question 
of fact [sic] therefore as to whether the Sixth Judicial District 
Court, in and for Sanpete County, had the authority to rule upon 
this motion for summary judgment." (Plaintiffs' Brief 38). 
Defendants are unable to discern the basis for this contention, 
and it is obviously without merit. 
POINT VI 
THE JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS ON THE ANTITRUST 
CLAIMS AND ON THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS AGAINST 
MEL PARKS WAS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The heading to the sixth point of Plaintiffs1 Brief, on 
page 40, purports to raise three separate issues: (1) that the 
court erred in dismissing plaintiffs Fifth Cause of Action for 
negligence against Mel Parks (2) that the court erred in 
dismissing plaintiffs Sixth Cause of Action for antitrust 
violations, and (3) that the court barred the plaintiffs from 
obtaining pertinent information and developing the case in 
pre-trial discovery by evidentiary rulings at the time of 
depositions before the court. 
As to the first contention, concerning the Fifth Cause of 
Action for negligence against Mel Parks, plaintiffs did not 
offer any evidence at trial in support of the claim, and 
advisedly stipulated to the dismissal of the claim. (Tr. 636). 
As to the third claim, that the trial court prevented the 
plaintiffs from developing their case, the plaintiffs offer no 
argument, other than the heading itself, in support of their 
position. Furthermore, plaintiffs do not, by specific citations 
to the record, identify for this Court the nature of the claimed 
errors. A review of the entire record will reveal that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the 
plaintiffs' discovery, especially in light of the oppressive 
discovery which had occurred prior to the time the depositions 
in question were taken. 
Plaintiffs do attempt to provide argument with respect to 
their antitrust claim. Plaintiffs1 complaint did not, however, 
state a claim for an antitrust violation, and plaintiffs clearly 
did not prove such a violation. The primary basis15 for 
plaintiffs' claim, set forth on page 44 of Plaintiffs' Brief, is 
that defendants made improper complaints to six governmental 
agencies. The initial problem with plaintiffs' claim is that 
plaintiffs presented no evidence at trial with respect to four 
15Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants restrained trade 
by defaming the plaintiffs. That claim is addressed in Point 
III above. 
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of the agencies listed. Further, with respect to the Sanpete 
County Attorneyfs Office, plaintiffs only offered evidence that 
Del Taylor had visited the county attorney, (Tr. 292-93). There 
is no evidence concerning what Mr. Taylor may have said to the 
county attorney. 
Formen did present evidence indicating that Mrs. Reid 
registered a complaint against Formen with the Utah Department of 
Business Regulations. (Ex. 63) . As is set forth below, this 
clearly did not provide a basis for an antitrust cause of 
action. 
Another threshold problem with plaintiffs1 antitrust cause 
of action is that plaintiffs provided no proof of a conspiracy or 
other illegal combination. The Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-914 (Supp. 1983), prohibits only joint or 
conspiratorial efforts in restraint of trade; individual efforts 
in restraint of trade are not governed by the antitrust laws. 
See Joseph Ciccone and Sons, Inc. v. Eastern Industries, Inc., 
537 F. Supp. 623, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Plaintiffs did not offer 
any evidence of conspiracy or other joint action. 
The major infirmity with plaintiffs1 antitrust cause of 
action is that an antitrust cause of action may not be grounded 
upon attempts to influence governmental agencies unless those 
attempts were a total sham. Groups of persons with common 
interests may, without violation of the antitrust laws, petition 
governmental agencies to prevent or induce governmental action. 
Even if done with an express competitive purpose, an attempt to 
influence governmental action does not constitute an antitrust 
AT 
violation unless the complaints and proceedings before the 
governmental agencies are a mere sham. California Motor 
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 612 (1972). 
This is frequently known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, named 
after the two Supreme Court cases which developed the doctrine. 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 
Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 657 (1965). See also Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682, 684 
(Utah 1982). This principle has been reaffirmed by several 
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit. See, e.g., Hydro-Tech Corp. v. Sundstrand Corp., 673 
F.2d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 1982); Semke v. Enid Automobile 
Dealer's Association, 456 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir. 1972). 
Formen apparently claims that the Trucking Unlimited case, 
supra, holds that there are no first amendment protections in 
the antitrust arena. Analysis of the case reveals, however, 
that complaints made to or attempts to induce action by a 
governmental agency are privileged unless they are so baseless 
as to have the effect of preventing the plaintiff's own access16 
to the agency. 
Formen presented evidence of only one complaint by only one 
defendant having been made to a governmental agency. There was 
no evidence that that complaint, or any other complaint, was a 
16Forman claims, on page 47 of its Brief, that a distinction 
between preventing access to an agency and attempting to initiate 
action through those agencies is "over precise." Even a cursory 
analysis of Trucking Unlimited, however, reveals that the whole 
thrust of the case was to make such a distinction. 
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sham. The trial court's dismissal of Formen's antitrust cause 
of action must therefore be affirmed. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE 
PROPER AND EVEN-HANDED. 
Rulings of a trial court on evidentiary matters will be 
affirmed "unless it clearly appears that the court so abused its 
discretion that there is a likelihood that injustice resulted.11 
State v. McClain, 17 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5 (1985) (citations 
omitted). Only relevant evidence is admissible. Utah R. Evid. 
402. Even otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded by the 
trial court "if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, wasted 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah 
R. Evid. 403.17 A review of the evidentiary rulings cited in 
Plaintiffs1 Brief reveals that each was proper in light of these 
rules. See Appendix "B". 
Plaintiffs claim the court erred in excluding the testimony 
of Ross Blackham, the Sanpete County Attorney. (Plaintiffs' 
Brief 49-51) . Plaintiffs called Mr. Blackham to give his legal 
opinion as to whether the actions of the plaintiffs constituted 
a violation of the Sanpete County ordinances. (Tr. 477). The 
court excluded the evidence as irrelevant. (Tr. 478) . The legal 
opinion of an attorney is obviously not relevant nor admissible 
17Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, cited by plaintiffs 
on page 48 of their Brief, was abrogated September 1, 1983, long 
before the trial in this matter. 
in evidence. Also, the opinion sought to be obtained was one of 
the ultimate question for the trier of fact. The opinion of the 
lawyer would have usurped the province of the court. 31 Am. 
Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 69 (1967). 
Plaintiffs claim, however, that the court allowed defendants 
to cross-examine Don Skipworth, one of the plaintiffs1 witnesses, 
concerning the legality of Formen's actions, and claim that it 
was improper to exclude the testimony of Mr. Blackham but yet 
allow the cross-examination of Mr. Skipworth on the same subject. 
The difference is readily explained by the fact that the 
testimony elicited from Mr. Skipworth was during 
cross-examination. The scope of cross-examination has 
traditionally been much more liberal than that of direct 
examination. The trial court similarly overruled the defendants1 
objections when the plaintiffs cross-examined the defense 
witnesses concerning the legal effect of certain documents. (Tr. 
848) . 
Most of plaintiffs1 arguments concerning the court's 
evidentiary rulings are contained in plaintiffs1 Statement of 
Facts. A detailed response to each of plaintiffs1 contentions 
would be voluminous, and would not materially assist this Court. 
A review of the entire transcript, and especially of the portions 
cited by plaintiffs (attached hereto in Appendix "B"), reveals 
that the court excluded irrelevant evidence or hearsay offered on 
direct examination. The court was much more liberal concerning 
the scope of cross-examination. Many of defendants1 questions 
during cross-examination, although objections thereto were 
50 
overruled by the court, did not yield any relevant or harmful 
information. (See, e.g., Tr. 179, 184). The court even-handedly 
sustained similar objections to defendants' questioning of their 
witnesses, and overruled defense objections to plaintiffs' 
cross-examination of witnesses. (See, e.g., Tr. 733-36, 761, 
766, 848). 
POINT VIII 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
Where defendants were awarded attorney's fees at trial, 
they are similarly entitled to an award of attorney's fees for 
defending this appeal. See Management Services Corp v. 
Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). 
In addition, defendants respectfully submit that plaintiffs' 
appeal of this matter was frivolous and improperly presented. 
Evidence of this includes the following: plaintiffs 
couched their entire appeal in terms of the jury trial standard 
of review, in spite of long-established law to the contrary. 
Plaintiffs claimed error in the dismissal of the negligence 
action against Mel Parks, but had stipulated to the dismissal at 
trial. Plaintiffs' claim jurisdictional and factual defects in 
the summary judgment for the foreclosure defendants, but fail to 
identify the nature of those defects. 
The Statement of Facts section of Plaintiffs' Brief is very 
argumentative. Some of the quotations from the record are taken 
out of context or are misrepresented. (Plaintiff's Brief 17, 
18) . Plaintiffs refer to the allegations of their complaint as 
51 
though they were evidence, (id. 5) , and make factual assertions 
that have no basis in the evidence. (Id. 32). 
Defendants therefore are entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees for defending this appeal pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 33. 
See Tedeschi v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 757 F.2d 
465 (2d Cir. 1985) (award of double costs and damages). 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants request that the judgment of the trial court be 
affirmed, and that defendants be awarded their costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this Z4^ day of October, 1985. 
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Statements Alleged to Have Been Made by Defendants 
Mel Parks: Testimony by Fred Smith: He said he could 
do business with me but Ted Bradford and 
Don Skipworth were crooks, he couldn't 
stand them and he just wouldn't do 
business with them and that he was going 
to get them if he could. (Tr. 305). 
Del Tavlor: Testimony by Louis K. Sharp: I can't give 
you any quotes but he advised me at the 
time that Fred Smith was undermining the 
Property Owner's Association, that 
he was misusing Association funds and he 
advised me not to pay my Association dues 
because of the fact. (Tr. 313). 
Testimony by Frank P. Pino: [Mr. Taylor 
said] not to pay my assessments and that 
Fred Smith was high on his prices and on 
his equipment. (Tr. 544). 
Testimony by Frank P. Pino: [Mel Parks 
and Del Taylor] said Formen Corporation 
and Fred Smith was taking all the 
[assessment] money and not to do any-
thing. (Tr. 545). 
Signed the "Fireworks" letter. (Ex. 35). 
Hal Parks: Apparently acquiesced in the "Fireworks" 
letter. (Ex. 35). 
Brvce Averill: Apparently acquiesced in the "Fireworks" 
letter. (Ex. 35). 
Testimony by Don Skipworth: It was 
stated by Bryce Averill in that meeting 
that Fred Smith was the Association and 
that the money went to him and he would 
spend it however he well pleased. (Tr. 
81). 
Testimony by Tony Escobar: That you 
can't believe anything they [Formen] say. 
(Tr. 203). 
Testimony by Tony Escobar: He said that 
if — he doubts I would be able to build 
on the property because I'd have to bring 
the lumber in one stick at a time 
because the covenants said I could 
not have any property on the ground. 
Testimony by Gary Christiansen: To the 
best of my recollection was that Fred 
Smith was a liar and never kept his 
promise, you could never give a land 
deed, and you could never get any water 
rights from him . . . . (Tr. 514). 
Testimony by Bradley Craig: Well, 
we were talking about the lots and 
what was going on up there and he 
told me that Formen Corporation was 
nothing but a scam to get people's money 
and that their main objective was to 
foreclose as soon as they had possible 
time to do and that they were liars and 
cheats. (Tr. 530). 
Keith Huffaker: 
Apparently acquiesced in the "Fireworks" 
letter. (Ex. 35). 
Elza Huffaker: Apparently acquiesced in the "Fireworks" 
letter. (Ex. 35). 
Testimony by Tony Escobar: She said that 
there were several properties that had 
been foreclosed on and that Fred was 
foreclosing the properties to get the 
water and the property. (Tr. 201). 
Mr. Gene Reid: Apparently acquiesced in the "Fireworks" 
letter. (Ex. 35). 
Mrs. Jean Reid: Apparently acquiesced in the "Fireworks" 
letter. (Ex. 35). 
Wrote a letter to Utah Department of 
Business Regulations (Ex. 63). 
Testimony by Bradley Craig: Well, 
the occasion started when we were 
talking about our lots and they were next 
to each other, and I had purchased some 
water rights. They told me they had no 
right to sell any water rights because 
Formen Corporation did not have any water 
rights to sell me. (Tr. 528-529). 
Testimony by Bradley Craig: Mrs. Gene 
Reid said that Fred and Max Smith 
were liars and cheats and that anything 
they did for the subdivision that they 
were pocketing the money. (Tr. 529). 
APPENDIX "B" 
Cross-examination of Don Skipworth 
A P robab ly . 
0 Sure . Have you eve r hea rd Mr. Smith say 
p u b l i c l y , " I am the A s s o c i a t i o n , " when anybody s a i d 
"Who's t h e Home Owners A s s o c i a t i o n , M have you eve r heard 
Mr. Smith s a y , " I am the A s s o c i a t i o n , ' 1 o r words to t h a t 
e f f e c t ? 
A I c a n ' t r e c a l l t h a t . 
Q Wel l , i f somebody hea rd him say t h a t , would 
you t h ink t h a t might a rouse some concern about how the 
money was going to be used? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: W e ' l l o b j e c t , t h a t ' s specu-
l a t i o n , Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Wel l , the o b j e c t i o n ' s o v e r r u l e d . 
I t ' s c r o s s examina t ion . He can answer i t i f he can, and, 
i f he c a n ' t , he can say he c a n ' t . 
A I c a n ' t answer t h a t . 
Q Did you give them any p r o j e c t i o n , budget 
p r o j e c t i o n , as to how you were going to use t h i s a s s e s s -
ment? 
A No, s i r , I d i d n ' t . 
Q Wel l , the peop le t h a t were going t o pay i t , 
d i d n ' t you t h i n k they might have a r i g h t to know how i t 
was going to be used? 
A I guess so . 
Q Do you think that somebody might think they 
Cross-examination of Don Skipworth 
ground maybe; i s n ' t tha t r i eh t? 
A I don' t think so. 
Q DiJ you see that Ballard gave you whatever 
rights they ha^ but they weren't sure of what rights they 
had? 
A Yes. 
0 And that has been said to the trustee; is that 
right? 
A Later, yes, 
0 Alr igh t , L i t e r , but the point of the s tory is 
tha t you couldn ' t r ive a var rantv deed and t h a t ' s whv. 
A lie could five a warranty deed, 
Q An:: then in the ne:-:t offer ing c i r cu l a r you 
could only give a special var ranty deed because of your 
l i m i t a t i o n s of t i t l e ? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know the difference between a spec ia l 
warranty deed and a var ranty deed? 
A Apparently' I don ' t , s i r . 
Q But the poin t I'm making i s tha t there was no 
way tha t you could r ive a warranty deed and, i* tha t were 
t rue , then th i s statement would be a l i e ; wouldn't i t ? 
A CTo answer). 
Q I say i f you apree with tne that the statement 
A I d idn ' t arrree with you. 
n I S8v if you assume --
A Well, I d i d n ' t assume. 
Q L o t ' s say tha t you assume for the purpose of 
the record. 
A I'm. net roin*; to assume because I don ' t udner-
stand the technica l difference he re . 
Q But, i f vou cou ldn ' t r e t a warranty deed, then 
a s t a tenan t l i k e tha t woul-l be dishonesty; wouldn' t i t ? 
A M*. fH*lMERHAvF: ^Te ob i ec t , Your Honor, i t ' s 
assuming fact** n o t in evidence. 
TF1: COURT: Objec t ion ' s overruled, i t ' s 
cross examination. He can answer i t i f he can and, i f he 
c a n ' t , he can say he e n n ' t . 
O Do you understand the question? 
A No. 
o T*. in f a c t ? i f the t r u t h were tha t vou 
cou ldn ' t give a warrantv deed, then a statement l i k e t h i s 
in a nu^ l i c of^erin^ statement would be a l i e ; wouldn ' t 
i t ? 
A Annarentlv so. 
0 Al r iph t . Now, i t ' s my understanding tha t 
the s e l l e r w i l l pay the cost of a t i t l e po l icy i f one i s 
reauested and T,m looking at Pace 12. 
A The purchaser w i l l pay recording fees. 
S e l l e r w i l l pay the cost of t i t l e nol icy upon reques t . 
Cross-examination of Don Skipworth 
Baclcman r e f e r r ed to in the f i r s t two water agreements in 
27040 you over - - l e t me see i f you can agree with t h i s : 
Rennart has only 37 acre feet to begin with 
and he conveyed everything but one acre foot so t h e r e ' s 
413 plus what, 414.27 acre feet to supply 100 acre feet 
of water sold; i s that not true? 
A That ' s not t rue . 
Q Hot;, the pr ices were a l l var ied in tha t — 
in those opt ions . Let me ask you t h i s : 
X^y would you enter in to Water Sales Agreement 
between Rennart and Former* and Rennart and Hideaway; why 
enter in to these kind of agreements when Rennart doesn ' t 
have any t i t l e to any water? 
MR. SUICr.PJIAYS: We w i l l ob jec t , Your Honor, 
t ha t assumes a fact be l ied by a l l of the evidence. 
MP.. HOWARD: Well, Rennart i s the one who 
answered t ha t In te r roga tory . 
THE COURT: Well, the o b j e c t i o n ' s overruled. 
He can answer i f i t he can and, i f he c a n ' t answer i t , he 
can j u s t say tha t he can ' t answer i t . 
A I c a n ' t answer i t . 
0 Well, is Rennart — do you intermix Rennart 
with Hideaway or Rennart with Formen? 
A I had nothing to do with Rennart. 
THE COURT: lir. Smith is the Secretary-
Cross-examination of Don Skipworth 
Q Use for what? You p u t the t i t l e a t t he 
i n c e p t i o n i n t o Fortran? 
A Yes, t h a t ' s r i e h t , we pu rchased the p r o p e r t y 
i n Formen C o r p o r a t i o n . 
0 And Hideaway Val ley was for what purpose? 
MR. SUM?SP5IAYS: Your Honor, I t h i n k we a r e 
b e l a b o r i n g t h i s and I ' v e pot a number of w i t n e s s e s out of 
t h e h a l l t h a t we've 50c tc ? e t t o . 
THE COURT: Well , a r e you making an o b j e c -
t i o n ? 
VT)
. SU^^ CFJl*-* Y> : Yes . 
TI-Z COURT: The o b j e c t i o n ' s o v e r r u l e d . Are 
you through w i t h the q u e s t i o n , Mr. Howard? 
MR. HOWARD: I t h i n k t h a t ' s a l l I have on 
t h a t . 
Q I s Red T a c o r p o r a t i o n ? 
TIE COURT PZPORTER: What i s t h a t ? 
MP. • HOWARD: R E D - Z. 
Q I s t h a t a c o r p o r a t i o n ? 
A I th ink i t i s , s i r . 
Q Who owns t h a t c o r p o r a t i o n ? 
A Fred Smith. 
0 And Red Z, w h a t ' s Red Z ' s b u s i n e s s ? 
A I don 1 t know. 
Q Did Red Z cons t ruc t : the roads UD t h e r e i n 




























E x h i b i t #33 was duly 
r e c e i v e d i n ev idence . 
Would you read i t t o the Court , p l e a s e ? 
In i t s e n t i r e t y . 
Q In i t s e n t i r e t y and w e ' r e a l l grown up peop le 
and we can u n d e r s t a n d i t . 
A f ,17 Hay f 8 3 . S a l t Lake C i ty . J /B R e s t a u r a n t s , 
7:00 P.M. Fred Smith came up to ne whi l e I was on the 
phone a t J / B ' s whi le I was in S a l t Lake C i ty . He s a i d he 
had an eye w i t n e s s t h a t saw me d r i v e my car i n t o the 
d i t c h d e l i b e r a t e l y and I t o l d him, ' F i n e , ' t h a t I would 
see him i n Court and be sure he would b r i n g h i s lawyer 
and he s a i d , ' F i n e , ' he would. He walked away and came 
back say ing I was t h e " • -
0 Wel l , I can r e a d t h a t . You n e e d n ' t r ead t h a t 
b u t you d i d n ' t t h i n k t h a t was e n t i r e l y f l a t t e r i n g ; d id 
you? 
A No, s i r . 
Q Was t h a t language in your judgment s l a n d e r 
and o f f e n s i v e to you? 
THE COURT: I d o n ' t know what the language 
i s . 
MR. HOWARD: Let me j u s t hand i t to you, 
Judge , because i t seems to be language we d o n ' t want t o 
1 read but it's right here in the third paragraph. 
2 THE COURT: Alright, I'll read it. 
3 (Whereupon the Court read the exhibit after 
4 which tine the following proceedings were had:) 
5 I MR. HOWARD: I heard that once when I was in 
6 the Navy. 
7 THE COURT: Alright, zo ahead. 
8 I A Do you want rae to read it. 
9 | THE COURT: Just jump over the language 
and let the Supreme Court read it if thev want to. 
A I said, :lFine, I could quote you to that. 
"f^ o ahead,'' he said and walked away. Lamar 
Macklin and his wife were sitting on a bench a few feet 
away and undoubtedly overheard it. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, at this point, 
we would like to object to that supposed complaint evi-
17 |j dence is not relevant in this litigation. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure it is or not but I 
think I'd better hear it. 
MR. HOWARD: Alright. 
0 Better read it. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Go ahead. 
A "Pat Monteer was also at the door and I went 
in and told Del and Steven exactly what had been said. 
















1 b r o a d l y . He walked away and r e t u r n e d wi th Pa t s ay ing , 
2 jj we had no b u s i n e s s be ing t h e r e and to l e a v e . ye t o l d him 
we were home owners and came to r e p o r t on our f i n d i n g s . 
He s a i d we could ho ld our own meet ing and a bunch of 
i n s u l t s and l e f t . We went o u t s i d e to f ind ou t what was 
5 jj happening and they were ve ry provoked about our be ing 
7 t h e r e . Fred t o l d Macklin what he wanted to do was to 
8 meet and d i smis s the meet ing and I asked Fred i f he were 
9 i n charge and he grabbed my arm and s a i d , fMy boy, I 'm 
10 || i n charge of e v e r y t h i n g , 1 and I t o l d him to l e t mv arm go 
n li and he would n o t . I t o l d him to t a k e h i s hands off of 












fNo committee, no authority, no rights, etc.1 He came 
14 up with a tape recorder going, talking very much, very 
nicely saying that he would be glad to be asked to any of 
our meetings and he was very polite, etc. I asked that he 
be that polite at our meetings or if hefd act like he 
did a few minutes before." 
Q As you heard him say, !fMy boy, I'm in charge 
of everything/' had you heard him say those kinds of thing£ 
before? 
A No, sir, I had really not had any contact with 
23 Fred before 
0 Now, did you consider that somewhat arrogant? 
A Yes, I did at the time. 
Q Was the final approval on Elkridge granted 
after the incorporation of Forrnen Corporation? 
A Yes. 
Q And was i t after a Joint Venture had been 
executed between rormen and parks Enterprises, Inc? 
6 II A I don't renernber that coordinated date. 
7
 0 Now, what type of a subdivision approval did 
8
 J you seek when you applied ror that with Sanpete County? 
9
 A Just an approval to subdivide the land into 
"> lo t s . 
11 I Q And was that approval granted? 
12 A Y e s . 
13 0 What kind of an application did vou make on 
14 Hideaway Valley? 
15 J MR. HOWARD: Objection, it's not the best 
16 evidence. The application fom itself would be the 
17 best evidence. 
18 MR. SITEERHAYS: Wef re asking what type, 
19 I Your Honor, not what was put in it. 
MR. HOWARD: Of course, the application 
specifies what type it is, I suppose. If you're going to 
have hin interpret an application that's available to us, 
we can do that ourselves. 
May I voir dire the witness, Your Honor? 




1 Q What's the difference between the Hideaway 
2 Valley Subdivision and the Elkridge Subdivision so far as 
3 the applications you filed with the county? 
4 I MR. HOWARD: Oblection, not the best evi-
5 dence. 
6 THE COURT: Sustained. Don't you have the 
7 I application? 
8 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Somewhere in these boxes, 
9 I I presume, 
A They don't use an application. 
THE COTOT: Just a minute. What difference 
does it make anyway? You know, does it reallv make any 
13 || difference? 
14 I MR. SUMMERHAYS: Apparently not, Your Honor. 
0 Did you have a meeting with Mel Parks at the 
mail box at the Hideaway Vallev Subdivision? 
17 || MR. HOWARD: Obiection, time and place and 
who was present. 
THE COURT: It's preliminary. The obiec-
tion's overruled. The question is did ^ou have a meeting? 
A Yes. 
0 When did that meeting occur? 













I think this is totally speculative. 
THE COURT: The answer's on the record. The 
objection's overruled, you may cross-exanine on it 
0 Did you subnit that document with an attorney 
to the state 9 
A Yen. 
0 And did you submit a title report and title 
opinion with chat to the state" 
A A title repcrt was subnitted with the ouhlic 
of'erinp; statement and proposal, yes 
0 With the state? 
A With the State of Utah. 
0 Did that list correctlv state the status o r 
the title? 
15
 II A Yes, the State o^ Utah determines the verbiage 
16
 II most: o r the tine on sone o~ the lej;al answers 
MP.. KOUARD: 1 object to that. Thatf s totally 
18
 i| inconsistent with the facts o~ the law. In fact the 
19
 II statement that's on the front o r that says that's contrary 
20 to what it is . 
21 MR. S1JMMZRHAYS: Well, Your Honor --
22 MR. HOWARD: Nevertheless, I object to it 
23 because it wasn't responsive. In fact, he *s riven a 
24 question and then he answers and then he volunteers a 
25 conmentarv and I move that the conraentar^ be stricken. 
14 
17 
THE COURT: The notion's granted and the 
1 II 
commentary is stricken. 
3
 II 0 Did you work with the state with Mr. Bradford? 
A Yes. 
n And then vou subsequently worked with the 
6
 II state on a number of similar projects? 
A Yes. 
8
 || f> And are vou aware of the procedures that were 






 II form' 
11
 II A Yes. 
12
 || 0 And what procedure was used with vou with the 
state on this registration? 
MR. HOWARD: I object, it's irrelevant and 
15
 || immaterial . 
16
 || THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, for the record, 
we would pro f per an additional line of questions on that 
same subject and I assume that the objections would be 
20 II similar and vou would rule the same way. 
21 THE COURT: Don't assume anything, Counsel. 
22 I don't want vou assuming anything. You try the case like 
23 you feel and I'll rule like I feel I should rule and then, 
24 if somebody1s made a mistake, it will be on the record. 




you decide to have a clause in the registration statement 
on the Kideawav Vallev Proiect that said the land was 
clear of liens? 
A Because that's what Hall reconnended to our 
attorney and our attornev recommended to us to put it in 
6 I because, in their opinion, it was fee simnle in the 
7 abstract of title connanv. 
8 n Who is Hall? 
9 A Hall was the State Enforcement Examiner who 
10 | did the review on this particular registration. 
11 0 Mr. Snith I show vou what's been marked as 
12 Plaintiff's Exhibit -^ 35 and ask if vou can identifv that 
13 document? 
14 (Witness looks at exhibit). 
15 A ves, I've seen this document. 
16 I 0 What is it? 
17 || A We call it the MMore fireworks letter," as it? 
18 || captioned which is a letter that was sent out bv certain 
19 || people that is represented on here to our customers 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We will ofrer Plaintifffs 
Exhibit 35, Your Honor, 
MR. HOWARD: Mav I voir dire, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, 
24 || VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 





0 TJhen vou sav vour customers, you near, this 
letter was sent to the people who had purchased lots in 
this subdivision; is that not true? 
A Yes. 
0 And all thr ^eonle that had received this 




?!^ . H^ rTAD.D- T'ith that understanding, I have 
no objection. 
Y*l. ?L™!ERJiAvr • We'll o^fer ^I'zinti^ r s 
Exhibit 35, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Exhibit 35, beinr a letter, T 
haven't seen it -- nav I see it, nlease? 
*Cl. S7V?'ET,J:AYS : Ye s, vour Honor . 
THE COUP.T: Vhich I will entitle, "More 
"Fireworks," is received in evidence. 
(Whereupon plaintiff's 
Exhibit ^35 was duly 
received in evidence.) 
THE COIHIT: Dc vou want ne to read it9 
*f>. ST*?£RHAYS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COI^ .T: Thank vou. 
(T7hereunon the Court read the exhibit, after 
which time the following proceedings were had:) 
Tin: COURT: Thanh you. 
0 Mr. Snith, did you receive any phone calls 
as a result of that letter? 
A Yes. 
0 Hew many*? 
A At least two or three dozen. 
C- I don't want to know what anvbody told vou but 
Tfd like you to eivc us the substance and tenor, ic there 
was one, or the p-enerai nhcne call ressa^e0 
M\. HOUARD: Objection, it calls ror 2 con-
elusion and it calls fcr hearsav. 
T:X C0;TTlT: Sustained. 
:iu. SirflERKAYS: Your Honor, this is a critic!] 
evidentiary issue in our case and Mr. Snith, as the 
President of the conn any, is entitled to testify regard-1 
ins: general business conditions that affect his company. j 
Now, you know, we've had numerous communications with 
people conmlaininr that so-and-so said so-and-so and I 
do have a hearsay problem, but we think clearly that Mr. I 
Smith is entitled, ir he Rets a barrage of telephone 
calls and arguments to merelv reflect the condition that 
existed in hi:- business as a result of the statement b^ r I 
the Defendant?. 
How, vou see, that was the verv thine that Mr. | 
4 
Howard was complaining about yesterday that we've shown no 
2
 impact on his business. VJe've shown no distribution of 
3
 II publication of the slander and the only wav that it could 
be proven is to show the ultimate impact back upon the 
5
 Plaintiff and we think he's entitled to describe the 
6
 general business conditions and the general effects, not 
7
 J what was said but the general e j e c t s and result o^ what 
8
 was said. 
9
 MP.. HOUAPJV I donft have a:iv objections to 
10
 it him describing his general business conditions but the mis 
11
 chief of that kind of question is that there's no way that 
12
 he can be cross-examined. I r these things are critical, 
13
 one would think that you would pet names and addresses and 
14
 who was calling on the matter and make a note and he says 
15 that at least two or three dozen and that by itself is 
16 i speculative. How could there be at least two or three --
17 J there's 12 and that's a 33?, error in his statement and it 
18 shows pure sneculation. 
19 Furthermore the Court1s ruled and I don't know 
20 once the Court has ruled that it makes any difference to 
21 tell him that he's wrone. 
22 KR. SUI-^RHAYS: I'm not sure, Your Honor, 
23 what Mr. Howard is sur^estin^. We do have names and 
24 I! addresses. T don't suggest that Mr. Howard means we 
should brinr 36 Deople who will testify that thev called 
Mr. Smi th. 
'Ik. HOWARD: Uell, that certainly is --
!IR. SCf^RHAYS: Pardon n e , Counsel , l e t me 
f i n i s h my s t a t e m e n t . 
?!R. EOUAPJ): n0 ahead. 
*!?.. SuICGRKAYE: "e have the burden to sunmar-j 
±ze the business conditions of Fornen. \Te are havine a 
number of witnesses cone in anJ I think we will burden the 
Court even w:.ch the riunber ve ,iave but on each episode 
thev stirred un tremendous imnoct on the business, tre- ! 
mendous numbers of communications. Ue can't brine; in 
hundreds and hundreds of neople to describe all of that 
11 III CCURT: The objection is sustained, 
Counsel. 
0 Do you do anvthing as a result of the phone I 
calls which vou received" 
A Yes. 
0 Unat did you do? 
A Ue called Mel parks and told hin that this | 
kind of thinr would have to stop. Called Del Taylor and 
sent !fel Parks a letter through another Counsel, Karry 
if 
McCoy, statin^ that/there was a problem, that they ought | 
to come in and set lo\m with us like nen and ouit this i 
kind of rations o" stur^ through the mails. 
















in Mr. McCoy's letter to Mr. ^arks? 
%?„. SITCXRHAYS: I will object to the inter-
ruption by Mr. Howard. 
; : L HOWARD: I will object and move that the 
answer be stricken. He was asked what did he do and he 
said he had his attorney scni a letter and then he ranhled 
on with conrit-ntarr which was not responsive to the ques-
tion and, an I therefore causes these volunteer statements. 
I move that that which was net resnonsive and volunteered 
bw stricken; otherwise, I'd like to see the letter. 
11
 H 7IZ CClT/r: It's already on the record, the 
objection's overruled. You nay £0 into it on cross-exanin4 
ticn. 
14
 I 0 1 show you, Mr. Smith, a document marked 
Plaintiff's Exhibit ;-L36 bearing the date of January 7, 
1933, and ask. you if you can identi rv that. 
(Witness looks at exhibit) . 
18
 II Tl. Sr?£RHAYS: Your Honor, ma: I hand you 
19
 " a copv of that? 
20
 II A v e s , I recognize this. 
21 0 Uhat is that? 
22 I A It's the letter I sent to Mr. Melvin Parks 
23 |j asking him to co^c rorth i r there was a problem that they 
had so we could sit do\m and discuss it. 
25 II in. H^VAR7"): Your Honor, that isn't what that 
as an assistant manager in the bank in Las Ve^as. 
2 II 0 And, as a result of that experience that you 
3 carried out this assignment in the Formen Corporation? 
4 A Yes. 
5
 Q And precisely what was your assignment rep-ard-
6 ing financing? 
7 1 A For Formen? 
0 Yes. 
9 || A To see that we're properly funded and that our 
10 sales exceed our repossessions, that we maintain happy 
11 relations with the customers and in harmony with the 
12 association groups. 
13 Q And was it in that capacity, that you inter-
14 viewed people who wanted to terminate their contracts? 
15 A Yes. 
16 I Q Now, did you try to interview part of them or 
17 some of them or a few of them or all of them? How many 
18 -- what was your practice in that regard, if anybody wante4 
19 || to cancel? 
A At least 98% of the people that we sent, I 
would have talked to. 
Q What about the other 27*? 
A It may be that I was out of town or indisposed 
one way or the other, and they would just have rescinded 
25 || as I couldn't get them all on the telephone because they 






1 Q Did some refuse to talk to you? 
2 A Occasionally. 
3 Q I show you, Mr. Smith, what has been marked 
4 I as Plaintiff's Exhibit #6 and this document has, T,Number 
5 of Repos". What is that? 
6 (Witness looks at exhibit). 
7 A Well, I have a computer that I keep track of 
8 everything in a data nature and run graphs and charts on, 
9 you know, perpetually through our organization so I eet a 
10 visual picture.of what has happened. 
11 This is a consolidated and on an annual basis 
12 of what I keep track of on a monthly basis and it shows 
13 that in 1930 --
14 Q Don't tell us what it shows. Is that compute: 
15 in your office at Fornen Corporation, in your room? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q Do you punch in those entries yourself? 
18 A Y e s . 
19 Q When a contract is recoursed back to your 
20 coraoany, do you receive a communication in connection with 
21 that recourse back from the finance company that sends i t 
22 t o y°u? 
23 A Y e s , 
24 Q Or do they just come back in the mail? 
25 A They call. 
1
 Q And generally what would they say? 
2
 MR- HOWARD: Objection, this is hearsay. 
3
 I don't even know what financial institution we're talking 
4
 about or whom he talked with, objection, no foundation 
5
 laid, hearsay and no dates or times. 
6 MR. SIP1MERHAYS: Your Honor, this is just 
7 foundational, Ifn not asking this for the truth of the 
8 matter stated, I'm asking what was the custom and the 
9
 peraneters of that kind of a conversation to show the 
10 general knowledge he would have regarding that subject. 
11 THE COURT: Objection's sustained. 
12 Q Who were you dealing with at that time? 
13 J A Alta Thrift — let's see --
14 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, I'm not sure 
15 whether we have a witness in the Courtroom or not. 
16 A He's our witness. 
17 MR. SWMERHAYS: You'll have to wait outside, 
18 sir. Alta Pioneer and who? 
19 A Mortgage out of Oeden. 
20 Q Now, generally, when Alta Thrift called you 
21 and talked to you to discuss recourse, would they have the 
22 type of information which they generally communicated to 
23 you on a phone call? 
24 MR. HOWARD: Objection, it's hearsay, and 
25 irrelevant. What difference does it make? 
1
 THE COURT: Sustained. 
2
 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, in all due res-
3
 pect, this is critical information for our case. It's not 
4
 I irrelevant and it's not hearsay. 
5 J THE COURT: How is it relevant, Counsel? 
6 I don't see how it's relevant. Maybe I'm mistaken. 
7 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, Your Honor, we have to 
8 lay a foundation to show what business events occurred 
9 during this episode of slander. 
10 I THE COURT: Well, but --
11 I MR. SUMMERHAYS: If I may, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
13 MR. SUMMERHAYS: So I don't assume anything, 
14 Your Honor. We'll proffer the same questions with respect 
15 | to the other finance companies. 
16 0. With respect to Pioneer, did they have a 
17 I routine that they usually went throueh, the kinds of 
18 information they communicated back to you in connection 
19 I with a repossession? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, it's immaterial, 
irrelevant and hearsay. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: And we would proffer, with-






25 remaining finance companies. 
1
 J Q Generally; were you aware why repossessions 
2
 I occurred? 
3 A Yes. 
4
 MR, HOWARD: Objection. 
5
 THE COURT: Well, the objection's overruled. 
6 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, we will stipulate 
7 that the answer be stricken and would request that the 
8 Court rule on the grounds other than that the answer is --
9 if it hadn't already done so. 
10 I THE COURT: Well, you have lost me now, 
11 Counsel. Now ask your next question and, if you want to 
12 repeat a question, go ahead. 
13 0 Are you generally — pardon me? 
14 THE COURT: You have confused ne, start 
15 over. 
16 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Pardon ne, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
18 Q Are you generally aware, as President of the 
19 company, of reasons why repossessions occur in your busi-
20 ness? 
21 A Yes. 
22 !| Q How do you be cone aware of that in your busi-
23 I ness? 
24 A In interviewing the customer. 
25 Q Do you receive information from any other 
LU-LCUL. tJAcii mieiL-Lun u.L J r r e a anu-oi 
BY MR. SUMMERHAYS. 
0 How nanv sales does that exhibit show you had 
in 1981? 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, it speaks for it-
self. 
A 225. 
MR. HOWARD: Anybodv can internret it as 
well as the witness 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, I let Counsel 
read for hours vesterda-" out of the exhibits to la^ ? 
foundation for his rurther questions and I thin1/ we should 
be allowed to do so for about five ninutes. 
MR. HOWARD That isn't a prober response, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
Let ne see the whole thin?. 
(Whereupon the Court read r^or< the exhibit, 
after which tine the following proceedings were had.) 
THE COT*RT: What vear were vou askinc 
about, Counsel? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS- '81. 
THE COURT: Thank vou. Ask your next ques-
tion. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: May I see the exhibit, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
0 Now, Mr. Smith, your Exhibit 6 shows that 
there were 225 sales in 1931? 
A Yes. 
o It shows that there were a little over 150 
sales in 1980? 
A Yes. 
n
. It shows that there were a lictie over 100 
sales in 1982; is that right? 
A Yes. 
n Do vou know, yes or no, why your sales went 
down? 
A Yes. 
Mil. HOWARD: Objection. 
MR. SU12ERHAYS: We move that the answer be 
stricken, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: His answer? 
MR. SlTfERHAYS: Yes. 
THE COURT: You asked him if he knew? 
MR. STP£fERHAYS: Yesterdav. 
THE COURT: And now vou're wanting the answei 
stricken? 
MR. SUM?ERHAYS: Because I want a ruling on 
the record, Your Honor, on the merits of the question. 
THE COURT: The merits of what ouestion? 
MR. SIPPERKAYS: That I just ash and that he 
objected to. 
THE COURT: Alright, vour answer is stricken 
and the question is stricken. 
MR, S U M G R H A Y S : Don't answer the question 
until Mr. Howard's had a chance to object and the Jud?;e 
has had a chance to rule on the question. 
Q Yes or no, do vou know whv the sales were 
lower in 1982? 
?2l. SIPCSRHAYS: !Io objection at this ti^e, 
Counsel 9 
^ || MR. HOWARD: ^o ahead. 
13
 Q Do you know? 
14 A Yes. 
5^ Q I don't want you to tell me the factual in ror-
16
 I! nation like so-and-so said what or I reviewed such and suc$ 
a document but what general sources do you look tc ror the 
answer to that question? 
I want you to give us the names of sources, 
20 || business records or whatever. 
21 A The nunber of cancelled contracts each month, 
22 the records. 
23 J o is there anvthing else you rely on to know 
24 that your sales were down? 





 II inc: the contracts. 
subiect 
2
 0 Do you discuss that/with your salesmen? 
3 A Yes. 
4
 0 Did vou vourself act as a salesman? 
5 A Yes. 
6 0 Kov nany sales did you, yourself, nake during 
7 the course of the proiect? 
8 A 150. 
9 0 Vere vou out during this period o* 198? 
10 activelTr trvin<r to nake sales? 
11 A Yes. 
12 O Did vou calk to a number o^ prospects? 
13 A Ves. 
14 J 0 Did vou talk to the finance cocvpanv? 
15 A v e s . 
16 0 Did vou hold periodic officer meetings in 
17 j your corporation? 
18 A v e s . 
19 I 0 Directors neetings? 
20 A Yes. 
21 0 Stockholders meetings? 
22 A No. 
23 I Q Did vou study the industrv? 
24 A Yes. 
25 0 What literature did vou review to study the 
industrv? 
A American Land Developers Association, Recrea-
tional Vehicle Sales Association. 
o Few nanv prolects have vou developed as of 
that point? 
!fl. HOWARD: Obiections, itfs irrelevant. 
?fR. SU*f tERHAYJ?: foundation, Your Honor, as 
to his expertise. 
!!?.. HOWARD: You've asked hin if he knows 
vhy the contracts were cancelled so what difference does 
it make on how nanv were developed; oblection. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
0 Do you have an opinion, Mr. Smith, as to whv 
your sales were down in '32? 
A ves. 
n
 ^hat is that opinion? 
M*. HOWARD: Oblection, there's no foundation 
laid. It all calls ror total conclusion and I sunnose the 
best evidence as to whv the sales were down and oeotle 
cancelled their contracts, we would be entitled to know 
what each one savs. They know why they cancelled, not his 
conclusions or interpretation, whatever thev were, half 
a dozen or a dozen cancelled, Thev all misht have various 
reasons and for hin to interpret and reach a conclusion 
and tell us what his conclusion is, is objectionable. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. SUTCERHAYS: We eight as well rest our 
case and p,o up and appeal it at this point. 
THE COURT: Counsel, that's up to you. 
That's a decision you'll have to make. 
0 Did you, Mr. Smith, prepare Exhibit f36? 
(Witness looks at exhibit). 
A Yes. 
n what is it? 
A This is a computer run out. 
THE COURT: I have 36 as a letter rrom --
?Tl. SPC^ERHAYS: Excuse me, 37. 
T3IE COURT: 37, thank vou. 
A What was the question? 
0 What is Exhibit 37 that you prepared? 
A This is a computer print out of the sales 
lost because of 'Lei Parks and --
TIT. HOWARD: Ob lection, Your Honor, it's 
essential --
IS. SUMMERHAYS: We'll stipulate. 
MR. HOWARD: Object to that as a conclusion. 
THE COURT: Objection's sustained. 
0 How did vou prepare that document'' 
A From interviewing the people that had rescind-
ed. 
Q And is this one of your computer records you 
2
 prepared in the ordinary course of your business? 
3
 A No, this cane as a result of the lawsuit. 
4
 Q Did you reflect down here the people with when 
5
 I you had spoken regarding the Parks 1 communications to 
6
 your customers? 
7
 II A Yes. 
14 
Die you assemble that as a list of the cancel-8 
9
 || let-ions* 
10
 I A Yes 
11
 II n How many people are on that l i s t under "Can-
12 II celled Contract'" 
13
 |j A Eiph t 
MP. Sl r*ERHAYS: We will offer that e::hibit, 
1 5 II Your Honor. 
16 ?ni. HOWARD; Objection, it's a conclusion, 
17 it's an editorial c o m e n t . The purchasers that cancelled 
18 their contracts have a reason, I suppose, for having can-
19 celled and we're entitled to know the reason and I suppose 
20 that's the best evidence that the purchasers cone in arid 
21 testify whv they cancelled, objection. 
22 THE COURT: Oblection 13 sustained, 
23 0 Mr. Smith, do you, fron year to year in you: 
24 business, categorise reasons for cancellations? 
25 A Yes. 
9 
10 
j Q And what are some of those categories that 
2
 you fit those cancellations into? 
3
 A Sickness, unemployment, lack of interest, and 
4
 I then recently the crooks, cheats and liars comments that 
5
 th-j Parks were involved with. 
6
 0 Did vou make anv estimate in your own mind as 
7
 I to the reasons "or cancellation as reelected in 193^ bv 
8
 || Exhibit A6? 
IIP.. HOWARD: Now, that's a yes or no answer. 
A Ycur question a^ain? 
11
 i Q Did you in your rrind attribute any particular 
12
 number or category of numbers to the reasons for cancella-
3^ I tion in 1932? 
14 A Yes. 
15 j Q And do you do that everv year? 
16 I A Yes. 
17 0 Is that part of ycur ordinary business pro-
18 I cedure? 
19 A Yes. 
20 n What percentage in that year did ^rou attri-
21 bute to the statements referred to? 
22 I MR. HOWARD: Objection, Your Honor, that 
23 calls for a conclusion by the witness. Itfs totallv snec\ 
24 lative. He interprets it and then attaches a percentage 
25 and brings it in summarv form to which we have no onror-
tunity to cross examine. 
THE COURT: The oblection's sustained. 
0 What season of the year are your sales eenera 
lv the best, Mr. Smith? 
A Probably in the sunner months from April to 
October. 
0 Now, your Exhibit -4 reelects that June was 
the highest month for sales in 1931; does it not? 
(Witness looks at exhibit). 
A Yes. 
Q And then that July and August and September 
were significantly lower? 
A Yes. 
0 And that July, August, and September oc 1932 
were significantly lower than that, than in those months 
for fSl? 
A Yes. 
?R. HOWARD: Objection, Your Honor, the 
record speaks ror itself. It doesn't require us to s;o 
over every particular part. 
THE COURT: I presume itfs preliminary? 
MR. STF1MCRHAYS: Yes. 
THT. COURT: The objection's overruled. 
0 Would you ordinarily expect June sales for 
any particular year to be above 17 and the July sales to 
be below five? 
A I t shouldn ' t be t h a t . 
0 Whv? 
A It's sinner months. It should be reasonable 
consistently hirrber than what it had been. 
Q And how lonr do your surmer months1 sales 
stay consistently hiprh? 
A rron April until, vou knov, until October, 
and it depends on an early fall or snow. 
Q Is that reflected in your exhibit *or 19S1? 
A Yes. 
^ Is that rerlected in vour exhibit for 1?S2? 
A Yes. 
0 That you have hiih sales in July? 
A Not hi~h sales, we had low sales. 
0 Now, *rou nomally have hi~h sales. Do you 
know or can vou pive us anv reason to explain wVr your 
sales ^lunnetad in July of 1932, and continued low through 
out that sumer? 
A Yes. 
*IR, HOWARD: Objection, no foundation laid. 
MR. SUMT2RHAYS: Well, it's rieht there, 
Your Honor, in front of us. 
THE COURT: The objection's sustained. 
?IR. SU!?!ERKAYS: Mav I set the grounds for 
the Court's ruling? 
THE COURT: I don!t think there's any founda 
tion for it, Counsel. I thin!: it becomes lust so remote. 
!m. SITC2RHAYS: That he can't explain why he 
thinks his sales wont down? 
7! IF- COURT. Uell, I think he's °ot to have a 
basis. I don't thin!: he can come up with an assumption 
because of the ^ranh that he had run out on the computer. 
%!R. SlTCfERKAYS: T7ell, we know that --
THE COURT: And hefs put in information that 
isn't before me. Trie ruling stands, Counsel. I don't wan$ 
to argue with vou. 
**?.. SUMMSRHAYS: I'm not, Your Honor, I'm 
just tryine to find out the wav to go in this thine. 
^ And you testified, Mr. Smith, that x:hen the 
Fireworks Letter went out, vou &ot a bunch or phone calls? 
A Yes. 
0 Uere ~rcu a;;are or a meeting that occurred on 
or about August 15, 1Q32? 
?iR. HOWARD: Nov, I object to the foro or 
the question because the Fireworks Letter was in December 
and January of 19S2. He asked this question and then he 
asked if he was aware of a meeting in Aurust. 
TIT! COURT: Ma'/be he's qoing on to some-
thing else. 
J J L r e C t - eXdl lLLLldLXULL U l U . l i e u U U H . U I J . 
A Mr. Taylor said that that was correct, he had 
been down to the County Attorney. 
0 Did the County Attorney ever file any complaint 
against you or ever make a demand upon you claiming the 
subdivision is improperly done? 
A Ko. 
0 What did *ir . Taylor sav in response to that 
phone call? how was it left? 
A It was more like he was r,cin<* to, aeain, be 
in touch with us, 
0 Did he get back in touch with you? 
A Ko. 
Q Did vou call him ac;ain? 
A Yes. 
Q Wnen did vou call him? 
call 
A There was a subsequent/ that I had been informed 
about and it be cane obvious to me there was a severe 
problem. 
Id. HOWAPO: The question is, "When did you 
call him again?" 
A I think it was the 10th or 15, between the 
10th and 15th of September, there were a series of calls 
in through there and, you know, I was trying to find out 
what was going on and 1 was just no:: making much headway. 
Q Did the Bird contract that you had cancel? 
• e s 
11 
2
 Q Bid you take any action as a result of that 
3
 II cancellation? 
in. HOWARD: Against whom? 
5
 II ?!R. SUIC!ERHAYS: Against anyone? 
6 I A Yes. 
7
 0 H e l l , what did you do? 
8
 A1 I asked Mel Parks - -
9 y?.. HOWARD: The s t a t emen t i s i r r e l e v a n t 
10
 II and immater ia l and the founda t ion l a i d d o e s n ' t show any 
relationship to our problems. 
12
 || 0 Did ycu have a d i s c u s s i o n - -
13 I THE COURT: J u s t a t t h i s p o i n t , I don't know 
what w e ' r e t a l k i n g about , gent lemen. 
15 || >Tl, HOWARD: I d o n ' t e i t h e r . 
16 I THE COURT: Your o b j e c t i o n says i t d o e s n ' t 
17
 have any th ing to do w i th t h i s and I d o n ' t know i~ i t ,eoes 
18
 I or doesn ' t . 
19 MR. HOWARD: He ' s t a l k i n g about the Bird 
20 c o n t r a c t and he ashed, MDid you take any action?T T I 
21 ob j ec t because i t ' s i r r e l e v a n t and i m m a t e r i a l , and I d o n ' t 
22 see any c o n n e c t i o n . 
23 MR. SU!2IHRIIAY5: And t h e n I a s k e d h i m i f h e 
24 had a meet ing and I 'm going to ask him and i f he s a y s , 
25 "Yes , " when did t h a t meet ing o c c u r . 
14 
1
 Tin: COURT: Meeting with whon? 




 TUI COURT: Wel l - -
5
 ? n . ST?^RHAYS: And then he w i l l - -
6 THE COURT: Wel l , t h e o b l e c t i o n ' s o v e r r u l e d 
7
 and" I ' l l hear i t , but I d o n ' t know where w e ' r e r o i n ? bu t 
8
 i I t h i n k maybe I ' d b e t t e r hea r i t . I assume the Bird 
9
 c o n t r a c t was c a n c e l l e d but I d o n ' t know a n v t h i n r about 
10 i t or I d o n ' t know ar.y - o r e than t h a t . 
n r-!R. SLnCSRHAY?-. Wel l , he t e s t i f i e d i t was 
12 cancelled, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead, answer your next 
14 question. 
15 0 Did vou have a ir.ee t in p? 
16 I A I called --
17 J 0 ves or no? 
is A ::c. 
19 Q Did vou call anyone? 
20 A Yes. 
21 0 Whom did you call? 
22 A Mel Parks. 
2*3 0 \~*£ xr^on ^id v,,-su call. him? 
24 A I don ft remember the date on that. 
25 0 ^ive us the approximate month, the time of 
1
 year? I realise this is years apo. 
2
 A About the surfer of f82. 
3
 0 Was anyone else on the phone? 
4
 A :;o. 
5
 I 0 What did you sav and what did Mr. Parks say 
6 du r ine t h e course of t h a t c o n v e r s a t i o n ? 
7 I A T asked Mel why he sold Mr. Bird h i s l o t and 
8
 r r o n o r e d h i r to cance l rry l o t . . 
9
 r And what did he say? 
10
 I A " I t ' s a f ree coun t ry . M 
11 I 0 Did vou have a c o n t r a c t or s a l e w i th 
12 |i M a n u a l Tasova? 
13 A Y e s , 
14 0 Did you have a contract with Emanual Tasoya 
15 for the sale o r a lot in Hideaway Subdivision? 
16 A I seen to rer.ember that as one o^ the rescind 
17 || ine contracts. 
18 0 Did you do anythine about that rescission? 
19 A I asked hir why he cancelled. 
20 Q Did you know why he cancelled? 
21 M?. HOWARD: Objection. 
22 ME. Sr^REAYS: It calls for a yes or no, 
23 I Your Honor, it's foundational. 
24 !!?.. HOWARD: Withdraw the objection. 













;Q How did you gain that information? 
A I asked him 
0 And don't answer this question until Counsel's) 
had a chance to obiect and the Judyre has a chance to rule 
on it 
8
 vTny did !lr. Tasoya cancel? 
9
 »
 ylR. HOWARD: Objection, it's hearsav 
II 
10 
- A ^i. ww L..... ^ a S t. a - n 6 C . 
Did you have a contract with Lamar Macklin? 
les. 
13
 || 0 Did the LaMar Macklirs cance l 
14 
1 5 II 0 Do you know why? 
16 A 
17 :iR. HOWARD: Go ahead 
18
 j| Q rHiy? Don't tell us the substance ^ust tell 
us your source o^ information, 
20 II A A letter he signed. 
21 Q Did you do anything about that cancellation? 
22 A Just part of the lawsuit, lust tried to stop 
23 (I him from resciding and told him I thought we could get the 
problems ironed out 
25 Q Did you have a conversation with Mr. Macklin? 
A Uunerous times. 
0 Uhere did you have your main conversation 
with him? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection. I don't know why 
we go through this because the conversations are hearsay. 
THE COURT: Are you objecting? 
MR. HOWARD: No, he can answer that cuestion 
but I just said --
THE COURT: You may answer. 
MR. HCV-ARD: But it's tine wasting, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: When did you have it, that main 
conversation with Mr. Macklin? 
A About July of 1933 when he finally --
0 Uait a minute. what did you say during the 
course of that conversation9 
MR. HOWARD: 
Objection, it's hearsay. 
\Hl. SL7-2ERHAYS: What Mr. Smith said is 
hearsay? 
MR. ROVARD: Yes, it's a conversation. It's 
hearsay, we weren't present and that's what makes it 
hearsay, not because he was present. 
:TM s r rSP^AYS: Submit i t , Your Honor. 
Tin: COURT: Objection's sustained. 
Q Did you have a contract with Peterson for the 
sale of a lot in Hideaway? Did you have a contract with 
Roche, Myrick and Peterson? 
A Yes. 
0 Were they cancelled? 
A Yes. 
0 Do you know why they were cancelled? 
A Yes. 
0 How did you find oui? 
A I asked then. 
0 l*ow, a^ain, wait until you answer: 
Why were they cancelled? 
IH*. HOWARD: Irrelevant and irnnaterial and 
hearsay. 
IE*. SUIEXRHAYS: It's irrelevant? 
MR. HOWARD: It is at this sta^e, and itfs 
hearsay but che hearsay oueht co be adequate. 
:1R. SUI-CERKAYS: Your Honor, again this is 
information that --
THE COURT: This is knowledge based on the 
conversation he had? 
:iR. SUI2ERHAYS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Then the objection1s sustained, 
0 Do you have any other knowledge as no whv 
they were cancelled? 
A I just know why they were cancelled. 
Q From the conversations with those individuals? 
A Yes. 
Q And you have no other source of information? 
A :io. 
0 Have you had conversations with -- let me 
just try to short circuit this, Counsel and Your Honor, 
and I'm proposing co -- I'm pro "ferine a line of ques-
tioning whereby Ilr. Smith would testify about what Mr. 
Larry Andersen had told him in various conversations and 
I assume Counsel would object on the ground that it's 
hearsay. 
:[R. hOwARD: I certainly would. 
:~. SU121EHHAYS: I'e'll submit that, Your 
Honor, if I may do it that way. 
:Ulv KOUART; Thatfs not the way you make a 
proffer of proof, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I can't rule like 
that, 
! T - SU?2EPJ'AY?: A l r i g h t , 
THE COURT: T h e r e ' s no u s e o* s i t t i n g — I 
j u s t c a n ' t r u l e l i k e t h a t . 
!•?.. SuCSRIIAYS: A l r i g h t . 
THE CCURT: I can't accept testimonv like 
that so offer your testimonv and let me rule on it. 






A No, I'n noc. 
0 Why not? 
A Because I got tired of paying for a dead 
How, when you say n,a dead horse" what do you 
I nean that the property was virtually worth-
less. 
0 And why was it worthless? 
A Because I could not: sell it. 
0 Do you know why you couldn't sell it? 
A Because of the rumors, several rumors, that 
were floating around. 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, I'm going to object 
to the conversation regarding rumors. It may very well 
be that rumors were floating around but that doesn't --
17
 || MR. SUMMSRHAYS: He hasn't said anything 
about a conversation. 
!IR. HOWARD: I just want to make my objec-
20
 I  tion in advance. 
21
 A T tried to sell and --
22
 I THE COURT: Wait a minute. There's nothing 
before the Court at this time, than!: you. 
24
 || 0 Did your conversation with Del Taylor have 
any effect on your decision to sell your lot? 
0 Connected with the project? 
A That's a pray area. We chose to take a 
broker. 
0 And whom did you have as a broker? 
A His name is Homer Hansen. 
0 Did you have a listing agreement with that 
company? 
A That isn't the way you do it as a developer, 
no, we didn't. 
0 Is it Tri-Statc Realty Company? 
A Yes. 
0 And is Homer Hansen your broker? 
A Yes. 
0 And you had no listing agreement; is that 
right? 
MR. SU!?ERHAYS: We'll object, Your Honor, 
it's repetitious and it's also immaterial; that's immater-j 
ial here on that line of questioning. 
THE COURT: The objection's overruled. 
0 You had no broker agreement; isn't that true? 
A There is a broker agreement, yes. 
0 In writing? 
A Yes. 
0 Now, did you acquire water for Elkridge? 
A Yes. 
Cross-examination of J. Fred Smith 
speaks for i t s e l f , 
0 Well, I'm asking you that a r e n ' t you repre -
sent ing to the people that t h a t ' s an adequate amount of 
water? 
A No. 
0 Did you represent to the county that you had 
adequate water for each of these lots? 
A Yes, they verified it. 
MR. SUM?ERKAYS: We object to the form of 
the question, Your Honor, this was all based on the state-
ment that some people needed external water and internal 
water and now he's roughing this all together and he's 
confusing the matter and it's immaterial and irrelevant. 
THE COURT: The objection's overruled. You 
mav go back into it on redirect examination. 
0 Did you represent to the county, when you 
got this subdivision approved, that you had adequate 
water for the property? 
A Yes, in fact --
0 For each lot; isn't that true? 
A Yes. 
0 And is it true that you have? 
A Yes. 
0 But you just now told us that you didn't thinkj 
.75 acre foot was adequate; isn't that right? 
A Well, it would be more than adequate for sone 
people and not adequate enough for other people. Ue give 
them an election. 
0 Did you tell that to the county when you 
asked them to approve the penr.it just what you've told 
us today? 
A Well, the county checked it on a different 
basis. Paul Frischknecht called the state and looked at 
our plat and made those calculations and decisions. 
0 Uas Paul Frischknecht, WHS he the County — 
MR. SIPMSRHAYS: We object, hefs cutting ofr 
the witness's answers. Are vou finished with your 
answer? 
?!R. HOWARD: I apologise. 
A No, 
0 Go ahead. 
A And the State Sanitarian sent us a coordina-
tion between the regulatory agencies as to what amount 
would be mandatory on a minimal basis. 
0 Was Paul Frischknecht the Countv Attornev? 
A At that time, yes. 
Q Did you also employ paul Frischknecht to do 
personal work cor vou? 
MR. STTMMERHAYS: Objection, immaterial. 
0 At the sane time? 
TKF. COURT: Overruled. 
No. 
At any t i n e be fo re? 
No. 
And have you s ince? 
Yes. 
Have von eve r agreed to p rov ide any more wateri 
than .75 per l o t ? 
A Yes. 1 
Q To whon? I 
A To the buyers and I t h i n k Phase 1, and a s a i n , 
we have a l o t of phases t h a t I ' d have to look a t , b u t j 
E l k r i d ^ e had 1.00 ac re foo t and I t h i n k Phase 1 on Hide-
away had 1.00 ac re f o o t . 
MR. HOWARD: I ask to p u b l i s h vour depo3 i - I 
t i o n . I t ' s in t h e r e , Your Honor? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: No o b j e c t i o n , Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The d e p o s i t i o n i s o r d e r e d pub- I 
l i s h e d b u t I d o n ' t have i t h e r e . 
MR. HOWARD: I d o n ' t know where i t i s . 
THE COURT: Are the d e p o s i t i o n s downs t a i r s ? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Do you have i t ? 
MR. HOWARD: I 'm ask ing you, i t ' s up to you j 








uross-exananauion or j. rreu ammi 
A Oh, I see. Earlier in the association, yes, I 
was president. 
0 When did you cease to be president? 
A When we had an election and started the assess 
ir.ents. 
Q When was that? 
A October 5, 1982. 
0 And who was elected? 
A In what capacity? 
^ As chairman or the Hone Owners committee in 
October? 
A Kelvin -- well, the trustees were elected by 
the people and the trustees then appointed Mel Parks at 
my recommendation. 
0 It was somewhat of an election within the 
trustees; was it not? 
A ?d*ht. 
0 Was he ever discharged as a trustee? 
A Yes. 
0 When? 
A It was a few months later, Ifd say January-
February of fS3. 
0 January 10th; was it not? 
A I believe that is correct. 
0v Alright, now, on what authority was he dis-
charged? 
•fP. SUTf^ERKAYS: Ho foundation, Your Honor, 
when, where and how? 
MR. HOWARD: He said January 10th. 
THE COURT: Objection's overruled, it's 
cross-examination. 
A Well, the nomination of a chairman is an 
appointment and it isn't a-- you know, since he was 
appointed, he was also released. 
0 Did you ever give these people that advice? 
*i nO . 
Q At these meetings that you had -- strike that 
-- was Mr. Bradford a lawyer? 
A Which meeting. 
Q I'm just asking you about -- Mr. Bradford was, 
in fact, a lawyer; was he not? 
A Yes. 
Q And he also owned one third of the stock of 
the company? 
A Yes. 
Q And he still does; is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Was he p resen t a t the terminat ion agreement 
A I don ' t remember - - yes , yes , I think he was, 
Q Al r igh t , and you say there was some under-
*
 !I A ?That dec-anti0:1 v 
2
 ^
 TTP11, i r a stranrer should sac that and didn't! 
3
 jl know who Hideaway Vallev was, Hideaway Valley had no 
existence, they ni?;ht think that the creator o^ tha 
contract and the person who signed i t were l iars; i sn ' t 
6 II that, right? 
7 I i^9 ST™1M R^HAYS: n M a c t i o n i n n a t e r i a l . 
THE COUR :^ T-Tell, the o b j e c t i o n ' s o v e r r u l e d 8 
9 II TtT ? c~*oss e"taminatior 
10 O ,"~u r> r r - ^ t r C ^^r r-~*-*-£-** - Q 
11 I TIT?: COURT: You can answer i t i f you can; 
12 ^ n ' l *f r you can t , vou can say so . 
13 o r h^r^  signature- i s . T^Tho i s ths^*1 s "^red Smith 
14 ror P.annart Corporation, Secretary-Treasurer? 
15 A Yes. 
16 0 And Fred Smith, Aeent ^or Hideawav Valley 
17 vou signed both sides o^ the contract? 
18 A ves. 
19 0 Ttrs sort of like dealing with yourself; i sn ' t 
20 it? 
21 TfP. SUMMERHAYS: I object, Your Honor. 
22 A T do that all the time. 
23 *!R. HOWARD: *7c further questions, Your 
24 Honor. 
25 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Shall we proceed, Your 
A We nade some assumptions with respect to 
inventory, 
0 And what were those? 
A The amount, same amount, as shown on the 1982 
report, that's a very small item. Other current assets 
we held constant. That's a very small and not a material 
item. Mortgage loans receivable and payable, I've already! 
indicated. How, we commuted those. Loans to stock-
holders were held constant. Other assets were held con- | 
stanr. We increased fixed assets by 12.726% oer year 
and that was from the change in fixed assets as shown on 
the historical financial statement. Accumulated deprecia-
tion was calculated from our other assumptions. Notes j 
oayable were taken from the actual note contracts. Other | 
current liabilities were held constant. Deferred income 
also came from our amortization schedule. Common stock, 
treasury stock were held constant and retained earnings 
and other items generated by the net income shown each 
vear and that sets forth the assumptions we used in our 
forecast. 
Q Now, is this type of a damage study, Mr. 
Stuart, something that vou have traditionally used in the 
past as an approach to damage theory? 
A Yes, sir. 
0 And are there an3/ cases which you rely upon to 
support the basis ot that theory? 
MR. HOWARD: I object to that, Your Honor, as 
irrelevant and immaterial. 
!•&.. SUMIERHAYS: Well, these are traditional 
damage cases, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: What do you mean bv cases? 
!Tv. SUJ-S-ERKAYS: These are legal citations 
and authorities that economists traditionailv use for 
damage calculation theories. 
THZ COURT: The objection's sustained then. 
Q Why did you use the theory that you used? 
A Tae basis for our forecast is outlined by the 
American Institute of Certified "Public Accountants. They 
have set rorth ground rules for making forecasts. We 
used those guidelines. T?,e ten year forecast into the 
future was used because anything over and over ten years, 
when reduced to present value of some of the higher 
interest rates and interest rates which we selected was 
14.457, becomes immaterial and that is a generally accepted! 
principle in valuation matters and any forecast over ten 
years are, #1, fairly meaningless because it involves a 
very long period into the future and, #2, that the present] 
values derived from anything over ten years is so minimal 
that it is really immaterial to the calculations. Tne 
ten year forecast period is prettv well accented bv those 
1 in my profession as the maximum that is allowed. 
a 
2
 0 And that's/reasonable theory in this case 
3
 in your opinion? 
4
 A Yes, it is. 
5
 0 Now, have you become familiar with the lot 
6
 I sales that have been generated then on a monthly basis 
7
 i rrom these records as you have characterized them into 
8
 your record? 
9
 A Yes, s i r . 
10
 0 And did r7o\: reach any conclusion from tha t 
11 analys is? 
12
 A There are ce r ta in trends which are evident 
13
 from examination cf the lo t s a l e s . 
14
 0 Now, hot; do you evaluate a trend or determine 
15 tha t a trend i s evident 0 
16 A Through s t a t i s t i c a l means. 
17 Q And did vcu anply those s t a t i s t i c a l means to 
18 t h i s s i t u a t i o n 0 
19 I A Yes, s i r , 
20 0 And what are the statistical means that you 
21 applied? 
22 A Lease square analysis and what is known as 
23 moving average method of computation and both o^ those 
24 are used by statisticians in evaluating trends, and deter 
25 i mining; trends. 
I-/JUJ»C;V-.U c:^\jcuiu_i to. i LULL U I lAjofoo ±J j_a.v-x.\j.icx:ii 
TIIE COURT: I haven't heard, I don't know 
what. Ask your question and, if you don't like it, you 
can object/and then, if you like it, that's O.K. I have 
to rule as I go, but I can't rule like this. 
MR. HOWARD: Okeh. 
Q Have you reviewed the case pleadings? 
A Yes, the other gentleman that I remember being 
there was Del Taylor and there was another gentleman at 
the meeting but I do not recall his name or who he was. 
Q And, as a result of that, did you research 
that subject of whether or not, in your opinion, the sub-
division was being properly taken care of? 
A Well, I reviewed the procedure and the plat 
procedure, yes. 
15
 I  0 Yes, that's what I'm asking. 
A Yes, I did. 
0 And what questions precisely were you research 
ing? 
A I was researching whether the plats had been 
through the proper procedure, through the Planning Com-
mission, through the Sanpete County Commissioners and 
properly signed, had the proper endorsements on them and 
that sort of thing. 
0 And why were you researching that question? 


















the landowners in the subdivision. 
0 And what procedure did you undertake to do 
in research, what did you look at and what did you refe: 
to? 
A I looked at the minutes of the Commissioners1 
6
 meetings when those subdivisions were approved; I looked 
7
 I at the plats themselves; I looked at the Zoning Ordinance 
that was in effect at the time those plats were approved 
and, as I recal l , I also talked to the County Attorney, 
who at that time was Paul Frischknecht. 
MR. SUMIERHAYS: Your Honor, earl ier and for-
give me for making reference to a prior procedure, but 
13
 || earlier we get the bock and locked in i t an4 I'm wonder-
14
 II ing if we could pet that again and see when the meeting 
15 || is where this occurred, 
C?o down and <^ et i t , please. 
17 || 0 Now. did vou do that as Dart of vour ordinarv 
18
 duties in the ordinary scope of the discharge of those 
19
 duties as the Sanoete County Attorney: 
20 A Yes 
21 Q Would it have been incumbent upon you to take 
22 some kind of action had you thought there was a viola-
23 I tion? 



























MR. SIJtt-SRHAYS: I t h i n k i t goes to why he did 
i t , Your Honor. 
TEE COURT: T*Tell, i s i t incumbent - -
MR. KOUARD: He could be t o t a l l y d e r e l i c t in 
h i s dut ies and tha t doesn ' t change the law. 
THE COURT: I s i t incumbent? 
I-Cl. SlTfGRKAYS: I ' l l withdraw the q u e s t i o n , 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: vie 11 , i f you withdraw i t , I have' 
n t got a n y t n m g to r 




 n «- f 
vV-nd. L. i 
MR. SU!?T;RHAYS: -To thing. 
THH COURT: Well, if you withdraw it --
MR. SU!U1ERKAYS: I thought nayhe you didn't 
like me to withdraw it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Oh, no, I don't care if you 
withdraw it or not. It's a hard one and I was having 
trouble with it and, since you withdrew it, it solved the 
problem. I've found lots of attorneys that don't do 
everything they're supposed to; likewise, ITn not sure if 
it's their duty to do that. It's a difficult question and 
you withdrew it so I don'z have to rule on it. 0,K? 
0 Did you reach a conclusion? 
A Maybe you'd better start me over it again, 
Counsel. 
0 vou researched this subject? 
•A Right. 
0 And you told us the issue you were research-
ing? 
A That1s ripht. 
Q Did voi: reach a conclusion as to an answer of 
the question you were researching? 
A X reached a conclusion. 
o !i7hat was that conclusion? 
MR. HO!JARD: Objection, irre1e van t an d 
iimaterial. 
MR. SUMMF1RKAYS- Your Honor, let me tell you 
why I think itfs verv relevant. 
THE COURT: Okeh. 
MP.. PITMMERHAYS : Thev! re c 1 aininp? or we're 
claiming that they called us crooks, cheats, and liars 
and that the subdivision was illegally registered and I 
thoueht Mr. Howard did a real pood iob of examining Mr. 
Skipworth at <rreat leneth on that issue. 
MR. HOWARD: Thank vou. 
THE COURT: I hope I'm not supposed to agree 
on that. 
MP.. SUMMERHAYS: No, Your Honor. Now, I think 
truth is a defense that they're trvine; to raise and we're 
trying to shov; the elements of our disparagement. One 
is that they said we were illegally registered. That was 
not because we were properly registered and it was imprope 
to accuse us or that which would have been a criminal 
violation of the local statute and so I'm just trying to 
eet out whether we were properly registered and had the 
subdivision properly registered. 
That's all I'm trying to find out. 
MR. HOWARD: You'd better show the attitude 
of the time it went over in 197S and what I'm tryinp to 
demonstrate before the Court is whether they knew or 
should have known in 1978 what the ordinance of Sanpete 
County was. What his opinion is in 1933 has no bearing 
at all on the case. 
MR. SUMKZRRAYS: 7cur Honor, let's look at 
really what we're doing here. 
THE COURT: Let's look at it: 
Apparently the County Commissioners told him 
to go down, and look at the ordinance.. 
MR, SU^IERHAY^: That's right. 
TKR COURT: He went down and looked at it. 
MR. SU^^RHAYS: Yes. 
TU: C^URT: You asked hin if he reached a 
cocnlusion? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Looked at the ordinance, plats 

























:';IE COUP.!: Alright, so he looked and he 
reached a conclusion. Nov; you want to ask him what his 
conclusion was? 
r3l. SUIf.lZPJIAYS: Yes and, Your Honor, before 
you rule, let ne just say another words to you here. 
TO anead. 
at great length about whether he thought thac was legal. 
My client was forced to answer that question ten different 
ways. Now, certainly under those circumstances and I 
don't see any fundamental distinction between cross-
examination and direct or. that substantive issue. Cer-
tainly I'm entitled to ash this gentleman whether it was 
legal or not and in his ooinion anc 
.s nis cutv to 
determine it because, if it was illegal, then truth is a 
defense. They can call us croohs for doing that but, if 
in this man1s opinion there was no reason to prosecute 
and there were no violations that is evidence of the 
fact -- his oninion is evidence of the fact because he's 
an expert and that's his duty on that fundamental issue 
,+- ' 
of tne case ana tnat s one or the fundamental issues 
Your Honor is ~oing to have to decide in this case, the 
truth of the defense on that issue and that's the whole 
heart o* our action, Your Honor. 
THE COURT : But i t i s n ' t r e 1 e v a n t . 
!?R. SUMMERHAYS: n f c o u r s e , i t i s , Your Honor . 
Le t ne e x p l a i n t h a t a ^ a i n . 
THE CO^^: How i s i t r e l e v a n t , i t d o e s n ' t 
m a t t e r what h i s o p i n i o n i s . 
!!R. SUM**ERTv\yc : Pure i t d o e s . 
THE COT7RT: His o n i n i o n h a s no l e g a l w e i g h t 
a t a l l . I t h a s no l e r & l w e i g h t i n t h i s Cour t and i t h a s 
n o l e g a l we i r .h t - - and i t h a s no n o r e w e i g h t t h a n any 
a t t o r n e y t h a t FOPF- down t h e r e o r any i n d i v i d u a l t h a t 
goes down t h e r e . 
MR. SIJ?!MERHAYS: W e l l , I t h i n k h e ' s an e x p e r t 
wi t n e s s , You^- Hon or . 
?1R. HOWARD: Wel l - -
'
rTTE COTTPvT * (YH - -
MR. HOWARD: An e x n e r t i s o n l v a d m i s s i b l e i f 
he can h e l p t h e Cour t h u t h e ' s t a l k i n g a b o u t an a r e a of 
e x n e r t i s e t h a t t h e Cour t h a s e x p e r t i s e i n and so do I 
and Mr. Suismerhays. Tha t d o e s n ' t h e l p us one i o t a . 
MP.. SUMMERHAYS: I s n ' t h e , Your Honor? 
MR. HOWARD: He i s n ' t an e x p e r t w i t n e s s , Your 
Honor . 
MR. SIR^MERHA^-: L e t ne go t h r o u g h t h e f u n d a -
m e n t a l o f my a c t i o n . Whv d o n ' t you f i n i s h and t h e n I 
w i l l - -
TUT n u ? r : no ahead. He 's o b j e c t e d and 
y o u ' r e t r y inn to convince ne t h a t i t ' s r e l e v a n t so I 'm 
i n t e r e s t e d in how that: would be r e l e v a n t . 
!!R. SirrCRIiAYS: They have aceus -d us of a 
crime of s e l l i n g a s u b d i v i s i o n t h a t ' s n o t l e g a l l y r e g i s t e : 
ed and t h a t ' s a v i o l a t i o n . 
17?,. KP?7A?J): 'To, Tv£ neve r made t h a t a c c u s a -
t i o n , no cr ime. 
1171. P!r"T:RKAYS: I 'm no t sayinn t h a t . 
TUT COUTT: Mr. Howard, you keep q u i e t , I 
11
 |j want to h e a r v h a t he SCLVS. 
12 ii '-m TTnr*.PTv a ' ^ i ^ h t 
13
 |! '^tH. 5U;TJTIITIAVS : Dave s a i d we were t r y i n g to 
14
 Ii s e l l imprope r ly , i l l s n a l l y r e g i s t e r e d s u b d i v i s i o n and 
15 II t h a t ' s in ev idence . !Towf I can. <?c ge t AmJur, Your Honor, 
16 | Hornbook Law, t h a t they accused us of a s e t of f a c t s 
17 which amounts to a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e , t h a t i s , s l a n d e r 
18
 (J n e r s e , m a l i c i o u s n e s s i s presumed,, and i f I can show 
damage, I 'm e n t i t l e d to r e cove r u n l e s s i t ' s a t r u e f a c t 
t h a t t h e y ' v e s t a t e d and t h i s i s , t h e r e f o r e , ve ry r e l e v a n t , 
THE COURT: Counsel , your b a s i c founda t ion 
i s wrong. No. 1, i s t h e r e a c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e . E i t h e r 
the o rd inance i s ^ood or i t i s n ' t good. 
^ . S!nP£*:UY5: No, n o , Your Honor. This i s 
25 II a c r i t i c a l t h i n s . You and I have grot to unde r s t and the 
19 
same th ing . They're savin? , t h e i r pronouncement a t the 
meetings was, "The subdivis ion was not properly regis tered^ 
Now, i f t h a t ' s t r ue , then by our c l i e n t ' s s e l l i n g tha t 
subdivision tha t i s not r e g i s t e r e d and also the a l l e g a - ] 
t ions of the statements tha t have been published tha t 
t hey ' r e s e l l i n g the subdivis ion i l l e g a l l y , then they have 
accused our par ty of a crime and t h a t ' s a defamation. 
New, because I ' l l as;ree with the zoning o r d i - j 
nance which says , i f you s e l l an unregis te red piece of 
property in v i o l a t i o n of the zoning ordinance, t h a t ' s a | 
criminal offense and the c i v i l law defamation says i f I 
say - -
THE COURT: Now, i s tha t a criminal offense? 
A Yes. 
0 I s i t a cr iminal offense? 
A Yes. 
MR. SUMMSRKAYS: Thev accused my client of a | 
criminal offense. They say you committed something that 
is a criminal crime and then they defame him unless they 
are true, unless it's a true statement and so I'm trying 
to find out whether that was a true statement or not, 
Your Konor, and this man is the best man to tell us. j 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, may I address the 
question? 
















MR. SUMMERHAYS: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. HOWARD: We p o i n t e d out in c r o s s - e x a m i n a -
t i o n of Mr. Skipworth t h a t t h i s s u b d i v i s i o n d id no t com-
p o r t to comply wi th the o rd inance of 1974. T h e r e ' s no 
way t h a t i t d id and t h a t gave j u s t i f i c a t i o n fo r peop le 
to say t h a t somebody may have m i s r e p r e s e n t e d f a c t s . I t 
went to t he a l l e g a t i o n of c h e a t s , c r o o k s , and l i a r s and 
nobody go t around the county and they d o n ' t a l l e g e or 
a s s e r t t h a t anybody accused them o^ a c r ime , t h i s c r ime, 
which i t p robab ly i s bu t you d o n ' t c a l l an e x p e r t w i t n e s s 
in and e x p l a i n the law to t he j u d g e . T h a t ' s j u s t unheard 
of. I t may be the Judge needs the e x p l a n a t i o n from time 
t o t ime , bu t i t i s no t cons ide r ed a p p r o p r i a t e or p rope r 
and i t i s n o t w i t h i n the r ange of e x p e r t i s e . You d o n ' t 
b r i n g e x p e r t s in - - o t h e r w i s e , t h e r e would be no l i m i t 
16
 I) to t h e Cour t . I t would be l i k e t r i a l by numbers . We 
17 l!
 would a l l b r i n g in peop le who have a d i f f e r e n t view of 
18
 || t h e law because lawyers d o n ' t alwa3/s agree bu t I sa:/ 
s p e c i f i c a l l y t h a t the ev idence p r e t t y we l l demons t ra t e s 
20 II and demons t r a t e s c l e a r l y t h a t the s u b d i v i s i o n as p r e s e n t e d 
21
 d id n o t comply wi th the Sanpete County Ordinance and 
22 the Court can de te rmine whether t h a t ' s r i g h t 
23 Mr, Blackham, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s l e g a l t r a i n -
24 i n g , c a n ' t be of anv r e a l a s s i s t a n c e i n t h a t r e g a r d and, 
25 [I f u r t h e r m o r e , h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n subsequent to January Is i 
of 1983 is remote, has no materiality, and to the thinking 
of the people at the time to qualify that subdivision 
doesn't go to any of the issues involved, it doesn't go 
to the questions of good faith and fair representation 
by Mr. Smith or his compadres in any respect. It's just 
his opinion after the fact and that doesn1t help the Court 
one iota. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Could I be heard further, Your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Surely. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Now, let's look at the logic 
of Mr. Howard's statement. MI showed, through examination 
of Mr. Skipworth, that they violated the ordinance." 
Now, Your Honor -- • 
THE COURT: Who violated the ordinance? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Formen. 
THE COURT: Now, you showed they violated the 
ordinance? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: I'm quoting Mr. Howard. Mr. 
Howard has said, ?,I, Mr, Howard, have showed through 
examination of Mr. Skipworth that Formen Corporation 
violated the statute in connection with that subdivision.11 
THE COURT: Alright, I'm with you now. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: He says, "But you, Mr. Summer-
hays, are not entitled to try to show through examination 
10 
of Mr. Ross Blackburn - -
2
 || THE COURT: Blackham. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Excuse me, Ross Blackham t h a t 
they d i d n ' t v i o l a t e the o r d i n a n c e . Now, who's b e t t e r 
q u a l i f i e d to t e l l us whether thev v i o l a t e d the o r d i n a n c e , 
6
 || Mr. Skipworth or Mr. Blackham? 
7
 Now, Your Honor, over about f i v e o b j e c t i o n s 
8
 | from me, you a l lowed him to ask Mr. Skipworth and he 
9
 |j says he accomol ished h i s duty and h i s ass ignment and h i s 
o b j e c t i v e through the showing of t h e t e s t imony of Mr. 
11
 |j Skipworth t h a t thev v i o l a t e d the o r d i n a n c e . 
12
 Now, I want to /h im the same q u e s t i o n i s a l l 
13
 | I 'm s a y i n g , Your Honor. 
14
 THE COURT: Wel l , t h e f a l l a c y , Counsel , he 
15 d o e s n ' t know the same in fo rma t ion t h a t I know or t h a t 
*6 you know or t h a t Mr. Howard know. I f he had a l l of 
17
 I t h a t , he might r e a c h a d i f f e r e n t conc lus ion and a l l h e ' s 
18
 g o t , a c c o r d i n g to h i s t e s t imony , h e ' s gone now and looked 
19 over the o r d i n a n c e to see i f i t was f i l e d as he u n d e r -
20 s t a n d s the law and he reached t h a t c o n c l u s i o n . So how i s 
21 t h a t r e l e v a n t t o me? 
22 MR. SUMMERHAYS: W e i l , I t h i n k y o u ' r e s a y i n g 
23 two t h i n g s , Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I f m s a y i n g m o r e t h a n two t h i n g s . 
25 I c a n ' t sav — w e l l - -
MR. SUMMERHAYS: L e t me b r e a k t h e m up a n d 
2 II respond one a t a t ime , Your Honor. 
3 MR. HOWARD: As f a r as I 'm concerned t h a t ' s 
4
 the end of t h e argument and w e ' r e w i l l i n g t o submit i t . 
5 |j THE COURT: Go ahead, f i n i s h what y o u ' r e 
6 s a y i n g , Counsel . 
7 I MR. SUMMERHAYS: You ' re say ing t h e r e ' s n o t a 
8 J p rope r founda t ion because we d o n ' t know what h i s op in ion 
9 i s based on. 
10 THE COURT: No. I d i d n ' t say t h a t a t a l l . 
11 The q u e s t i o n i s whether h i s op in ion i s r e l e v a n t and I 
12 i d o n ' t t h ink i t ' s r e l e v a n t . 
13 MR. SUttERHAYS: Well , I t h i n k i t ' s c e r t a i n l y 
14 r e l e v a n t , Your Honor. The q u e s t i o n i s - -
15 I TIE COURT: Well — 
is J MR. SUMMERHAYS: I s he e n t i t l e d to t e s t i f y 
17 what might be deemed to be the u l t i m a t e i s s u e ? 
18 THE COURT: The o b j e c t i o n ' s s u s t a i n e d . I 
19 d o n ' t t h i n k h i s op in ion i s r e l e v a n t and I r e a l l y d o n ' t 
20 ca re what h i s op in ion i s . 
21 Q Did the County ever chose to p r o s e c u t e Formen 
22 Corpora t ion f o r an i l l e g a l l y f i l e d s u b d i v i s i o n ? 
23 | MR. HOWARD: O b j e c t i o n , i t ' s i r r e l e v a n t and 
24 immater i a l . 
25 THE COURT: Well, the obiection's overruled. 
1
 i He can answer that whether they prosecuted somebody. 
2 A No, 
3
 Q Why not? 
4
 || MR. HOWARD: Objection, irrelevant and 
5
 immaterial.why they did or they didn't. 
6 THE COURT: Objection's sustained. 
7 MR. SUMMERHAYS: No further questions, Your 
8 | Honor. 
9 MR. HOWARD: No questions. 
10 J A Am I excused? 
11 I THE COURT: May he be excused? 
12 I MR. SUMMERHAYS: Yes, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I love you, Mr. Blackham, but I 
14 just don ft care what you think* 
15 A Thank you. 
16 (Witness excused) . 
17 il THE COURT: And I can t e l l you t h a t Mr. B l a c k 
18 | ham d o e s n ' t c a r e what I t h i n k most of the t i m e . 
19 I Nov;, have you dec ided whether you want to 
20 c a l l him o r no t? 
21 MR. SUMMERHAYS: I d o n ' t w a n t no c a l l h i m , 
22 Your H o n o r . 
23 THE COURT: Now, I have my regular Law and 
24 || Motion Day tomorrow, gentlemen, and I indicated to you if 
25 I we were goin^ to finish this matter this week, I'd have 
Direct examination of Neil Merrill 
0 Did you make a d e c i s i o n — did you ever go to 
2 I! 
II t he Formen Corpora t ion and n e e t w i th then r e g a r d i n g t i t l e 
to your land and your water? 
A v e s , I d id . 
Q lr.ien d id you po in t h e r e ? 
6
 II A About a year a^o. 
7










 II v ^ . IIOTTAnr*: A y e a r a r c w o u l d be -• 
0 H::cus£ ne *S2 o r ' S 3 ? 
13
 II A 'S3 
14
 || 0 Tr:.v did von r,o in t h e r e and ask then about 
15
 I' q u e s t i o n s about t i t l e to the w a t e r ' 
16 j| *.m U"TV.pr>. n V i r C r ^ o n "f t ' «! i r r o l o v s i f 
II fc. % • *. » v . _ • • - V-t_ . . . . , w ^ '— * . ^ ^ I. I l - k . l_» W? i . < > < . V . ^ V « Y C i . *. A. W 
17 ?..*T>B ST^ICRHAY": I t ' s v e r v r e l e v a n t 
18
 l Mil. HOUART: In the summer of fC3? 
T h a t ' s what he though t , Your Honor 
20 || Tin: COURT: The o b j e c t i o n ' s s u s t a i n e d . Ask 
your n e x t ques t i on 
22 || 0 Did any 
23 I j\ Perhaps some of thi.se dates are — 
24 l| 7I~ COURT: Oh, no, ash your next question, 
KR. SUM!ESHAYS: I will, Your Honor, I was 
j u s t s;oing to s t i p u l a t e — 
T!!K C^URT: T was j u s t point: to stop the 
witness as he was following throueh, you know. 
0 Pid anything - -
TIT COURT: I have to keep the witness from 
vo lun tee r ing , you knci;, he c a n ' t vo lun teer . 
0 Did anything happen p r io r to January of 1983 
to make you go in and see the rormen Corporation the 
s inner of 'ST rep~rdi~r. your l o t , ye? or no? 
A Yes. 
0 TThat had happened prior to that tine" 
A I had heard that--
IT.. KOT"ARD: I ' r pro in?, to object to h in r e l a t -
ing any conversat ions or rumors or hearsay without a 
foundation ha-ins: been l a i d . If t ha t question was d i r e c t -
ed toward that kind of response, then I ob jec t . 
KR. SlTCZRIiAYS: Your Honor, one of the things 
we have to shew in a slander C3.se i s tha t there was a 
general impact in the cormunity of the e f fec t of the 
s l ander . NOT:, we ' re e n t i t l e d to qo into tha t and we're 
not offer ing t h i s to show the t r u t h of the mat ter s t a t e d . 
Ws^re" showing why he went in and why he was concerned 
aKout••"his"title. Vow, that w i l l t i e i t back ir. with the 
other testimony. This i s the or inary n a r t of the case 
and unless we can show t h e r e ' s an inoac t , we c a n ' t support 
p o s i t i o n . 
Now, Mr. Howard has o b j e c t e d saying t h e r e ' s 
no way you can shew t h a t t h e r e was an impact and neop le 
so ld t h e i r l o t s an- so f o r t h or 7,ave then up, or d i d n ' t 
want to buy l o t s he cause of t h i s and t h i s soes to the 
gene ra l imnact and t h i s was through the whole connun i tv . 
V!R ?iO^TARO: He has sued c e r t a i n oeoole for 
s l a n d e r , for l i b e l , for i n t e r r e r e n c e wi th the b u s i n e s s 
c o n t r a c t s , c e r t a i n neo-^le , and he ha^ an o b l i g a t i o n to 
s ^ r ? t e s tim'"*^ v r e l a t i v e " *"o tha** but ^ene^al d i s c u s s i o n s 
in the conmu* i^*"V .-~*e n e t .^•^ r-p^^2."nc *.•« r$ r e s p o n s i b l e for 
and I o b j e c t . 
* m q ^ ^ r r ^ t ^ v o . V ^ M r - ^ r - ^ r f-r.7n f n n i l ^ t q i f T 
TUJEI COURT: ^o ahead, t h a t ' s why I f n h e r e . 
*!R. SU>ftERrI~Y9: One i s t h a t we have shown 
t h a t , Your Honor. 
THE COY*.?: Well , of c o u r s e , I d o n ' t want to 
argue about i t . 
11
 !R. SUr^CRHAYS: I 'm n o t t r v i n g to argue i t , 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And I d o n ' t want you t o , bu t when 
you sar^ t h a t , "T7e have shown," then vou1 r e s u r m a r i z i n ^ 
something t h a t I d o n ' t know, and I d o n ' t want you to r each 
the conc lus ion as to what vou have done or what vou haven ' 
done, I am apparently the one who must find that. What 
I'm interested in is the question and, when I get to what 
he said that he heard some rumors, and now you said, "What 
are the rumors,,f and that's why he objected and I believe 
ITm right on this. 
MR. HOWARD: That's right. 
THE COURT: And I think I've got to sustain 
the objection. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: May I be heard just briefly 
on this, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You want to tell me why I should-
n't and that's what I want heard. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We feel, Your Honor, that 
once there is some testimony before the Court that the 
rumor has been cast abroad by this slander that has been 
published by an individual and I think there is testimony 
in the record to that effect. 
Then we are entitled to show that once having 
loosed that slander statement it reverberated on through 
the community and had its ill effects way down the line. 
We have shown and they said we had to show a public impact 
and we have to show the publication and they are respon-
sible of having once made statements for what happens 
thereafter and, if there are rumors abroad in the com-
munity, then we're entitled to show that and that's the 
essential part of our case, Your Honor; that's the critical 
part and we probably ought to check some authorities on | 
that and present that to you because Ifm sure we can show 
you valid authorities on that issue which is clear cut, 
that wefre entitled to go over it with that kind of 
questioning, 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR, SUMMERHAYS: No. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. HOWARD: We filed a trial brief, Your 
Honor, that address every issue raised by the pleadings I 
and that is an issue raised by the pleadings and we think ! 
the objection should be sustained, 
THE COURT: Well, the objection's sustained. 
I don't feel like I can start allowing people to lust say I 
what are rumors and what the rumors are. I think you'd j 
better tie it down better than that, Counsel, and that's j 
the ruling. So ask your next question. 
0 Did you have a meeting with Don Charlesworth | 
regarding this lot or a discussion about the subdivision? | 
A Yes, I talked with Don on my property and at 
his home. 
Q And when did those discussions occur? 
A From the time we purchased our lot, we met 
Don right after that and until the spring of '83. 
Q At any of those meetings did you discuss the 
water title to your property? 
A Yes. 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, Your Honor, Mr. 
Charlesworth is not a party to this litigation; it's 
hearsay. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS; He's one of the parties, Your 
Honor, whom we1re alleging to be a co-conspirator. 
MR. HOWARD: But you settled the case against 
him and dismissed it, Mr. Suncnerhays, and that settled 
the lawsuit. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: It doesn't matter, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well — 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: If he's part of the group of 
people who are conspiring to --
THE COURT: Has he been dismissed out of the 
lawsuit? 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection's sustained on the 
basis of hearsay. 
MR. HOWARD: Sure. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Then t h e r e ' s no c o - c o n s p i r a t o r 
excep t i on? 
MR. HOWARD: You c a n ' t l e t him out and keep 
him i n as a c o n s p i r a t o r . 
10 
11 
MR, SUMMERHAYS: Oh, of course, we can, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained, 
Counsel. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Alright, Your Honor. 
6
 II 0 Did you ever have a discussion with Del Tayloi 
regarding your lot? 
8
 A No, I never did. 
9
 I! 0 Did you ever have a discussion with Mel 







 || 0 With the Huffakers? 
A No. 
13
 || 0 Averills? 
14 n
 A N c K 
15
 II MR. SUMMERHAYS: No further questions, 
16
 MR. HOWARD: No questions 
17
 I THE COURT: May that witness be dismissed; 
Do you have any objection? 
19
 II MR. HOWARD: No. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
21 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, I'm sorry, but I 
22 || have a couple more questions, 
MR. HOWARD: You weren't quick enough, 
2 4 jl Q Did you s e l l your l o t in Hideaway Val ley? 
25 || MR. HOWARD: He t o l d u s t h a t and I o b j e c t 
to i t as repe t i t ious . He gave i t to his brother in-law. 
THE COURT: He sa id he t raded i t to h i s 
brother in- law, according to my n o t e s . 
0 Why did you t rade your l o t to your bro ther 
in-law? 
MR. HOWARD: Objection, i r r e l e v a n t and 
immaterial . 
MP.. SUMMERHAYS: Tha t ' s very r e l e v a n t , Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Objec t ion ' s overruled. If you 
can answer i t , you can. 
Q Why did you? 
A Okeh. Bas ica l ly because of the bad f e e l i n g s , 
some of the bad feel ings of the cond i t ions , a lso I had 
purchased a new truck in the hopes of going in to my own 
business and freeing up. 
0 What bad fee l ings are you t a lk ing about? 
MR. HOWARD: Object ion. I t ' s i r r e l e v a n t and 
immaterial . I t has nothing to do with t h i s case and h e ' s 
t rying to avoid the Court ' s previous r u l i n g . 
THE COURT: Objec t ion ' s sus ta ined . 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: No further questions, 
THE COURT: Thank you. Now, you're excused. 
(Witness excused). 
THE COURT: Call your next witness. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: May I go get him, Your Honor? 




 A It was. 
3
 Q You saw them prepare it? 
4
 A No, I didn't, sir. 
5
 0 How do you know it was prepared after your 
6 conversation? 
7 A I didn't say i t was prepared after. I said 
8
 I hadn't signed i t . I t was not prepared or presented to 
9
 me before the conversation. 
10
 I 0 Oh, I misunderstood you. Was i t pre-prepared 
11 and by that I mean was i t already for your signature, 
12 taken out of a stack and given to you? 
13 || A No, we had to make some changes. 
14 I 0 The typewritten portion was a l l prepared be-
15 fore you went into their office; i s n ' t that true? 
16 J A I did not say that, s i r . 1 told you I had 
17 seen i t after we had our conversation. 
18 0 But I'm asking you th is . 
19 A You're trying to put words in my mouth. I 
20 did not see that before. 
21 Q I'm not saying that you did. 
22 A They wrote i t down. 
23 I Q I'm just suggesting to you that this is a 
24 form and that there was a lot of copies like this and 
25 you're not the only one who signed one. 
MR. 3JMMEFHAYS: Your Honor, we object to that 
question. 
Q Now, is that --
THE COURT: Just a minute. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We'll object to the question. 
He says, "I'm suggesting to you all of these facts.11 
Mr. Howard can't testify and he can't make those supposi-
8
 II t i o n s . 
9
 J THE COURT: This i s c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n , 
Counsel , so the o b j e c t i o n i s o v e r r u l e d . 10 
11
 || 0 What I 'in a sk ing you: This p i e c e of paper 
1 2 II was t aken ou t and they t a l k e d to you and pu t the da te 
13
 || i n and they asked you to complete the form. I s n ' t t h a t 
14
 a q u e s t i o n n a i r e ? 
15 A T h a t ' s what i t looks l i k e bu t t h a t i s n o t the 
16 j| way i t was p r e s e n t e d . 
17 Q Wel l , t e l l me how you got the document? 
18 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Ob jec t ion , Your Honor, i t ' s 
19
 the f o u r t h time h e ' s asked t h a t q u e s t i o n . I t ' s r e p e t i t i o u ^ 
20 and now h e ' s h a r a s s i n g the w i t n e s s . 
21 THE COURT: The o b j e c t i o n ' s o v e r r u l e d . I ' d 
22 l i k e t o know how he got i t . 
23 A Vickie S tewar t and I s a t down for s e v e r a l 
24 hours w i t h F red . 
25 Q I s Vick ie S tewar t your g i r l f r i e n d ? 
10 
11 
A As we attempted to divide all the assets 
evenly, we run into some problems because, as I understand 
it, some of the contracts and the lots were encumbered by -
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We object, Your Honor, lack 
of foundation, parol evidence rule. They are written 
6
 | documents. We need at least the conversations when they 
7
 ran into the problem and the time and place. 
8
 MR. HOWARD: Alright. 
9
 I THE COURT: Objection's sustained. 
Q Where did you have a subsequent conversation 
about curing the problems that developed? 
12
 II A I t would have been at Formen's office in Salt 
13
 II Lake City. 
Q Who was present? 
15
 || A Again i t would have been Mel Parks, Hal Parks, 
myself and a representative from the accounting firm in 
17 || Boise and Fred Smith and Don and Ted. 
18
 0 You don't know who the representative was? 
19
 A I don't. 
20 Q What was the nature of the conversation con-
21 cerning the division of assets? 
22 A I know that they ran into a problem. That 
23 they --
24 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Objection, Your Honor. He 
25 should say who said what and give us the names. 
14 
16 
THE COURT: Objection's sustained. 
Q Tell us the substance of the conversation. 
A I don't remember who said what at that time. 
I just know the results. 
Q Tell us the substance. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Same objection, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Overruled, the substance, you can 
tell us the substance of what the conversation was. 
A The substance was that they were unable to 
divide all of the assets equally, being the lots and the 
water, because some of the lots Fonnen had encumbered with 
sales --
MR. SUMMERHAYS: We object --
A Agreements. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: May I voir dire the witness? 
THE COURT: Of course. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SUMMERHAYS: 
Q Mr. Taylor, the Dissolution Agreement had an 
exhibit attached to it that sets forth the schedule pur-
suant to which the division would occur. 
MR, SUMMERHAYS: Now, I'd like to look at that 
Counsel. 
MR. HOWARD: That isn't voir dire. 
MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, is that where that was 
1
 generated? 
2 I MR. HOWARD: Subsequently. 
3 MR. SUMMERHAYS: That's all I'm going to ask 
4
 him is that question. 
5
 I Q Now, the agreement provides the assets and 
6 liabilities of the Elkridge Joint Venture are hereby 
7 divided between the parties hereto as set forth on Exhibit 
8 | "AM attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
9 || Now, isn't that Exhibit "A" which was the 
10 division? 
11 A Well , I d o n ' t know. I wasnt 1 a p a r t of the 
12 I a c t u a l d i v i s i o n . I don f t know i t was d iv ided up. 
13 Q Were you a l t e r i n g the terms or t r y i n g to amend 
14 the terms of t h i s agreement by your subsequent d i s c u s s i o n s 
15 A I d o n ' t know. 
16 I MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, we will object, Your 
17 Honor, the agreement is clear on what the division was 
18 and specifies it right down to the last lot. 
19 MR. HOWARD: Alright. 
20 MR. SUMMERHAYS: If he's trying to amend the 
21 agreement by verbal testimony that violates the parol 
22 evidence rule. 
23 MR. HOWARD: I'm not trying to amend the 
24 agreement. I'm merely trying to find out how it was 
25 I eventually developed. 
11 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained, but 
you may go back. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (Cont'd) 
BY MR. HOWARD: 
0 Tell us how or what difficulties you had in 
working out a method of evenly dividing the assets of 
Elkridge and why you had to develop a schedule to provide 
for distribution of certain lots to Park Enterprises which 
were in Hideaway Valley? 
MR. SUMICRHAYS: Again, Your Honor, we need 
a foundation on that discussion, what was said and bv 
12
 II whom. 
13
 I THE COURT: S u s t a i n e d . 
MR, HOWARD: May I have j u s t a moment, Your 
15 jj Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
0 I'll show you what has been marked as Defen-
dants' Exhibit 67. Have you seen that document? 
(Witness looks at exhibit). 
A I'm sure I've seen it but I'm not familiar 
with it. 
Q Alright. You will note that the document bears 
has no date on the front but it's siened bv Mr. Smith, 





 A I don't know if they put any roads in or not, 
2
 0 You had developed a subdivision in Idaho; is 
3
 ji that right? 
A That is correct 
5
 Q So you were knowiedpable about how to do sub-
6
 divisions when you cane dc^ rn tc Salt Lake and started 
7
 II talking to Fred Smith; weren't you? 
8




 I' r You helped' 
1 1 II - Y'es. 
12
 || 0 You owned a substantial interest in it and did 
13 substantial development, didn' t you' 
14 'I - The family corporation did, yes , 
1 5 II C You did i t too; didn ! t you0 
16 I A I helped in that, yes. 
And did ycu manage a complex for the family up 17 n 
1 8 II f.n Idaho? 
19 A :;o, s i r . 
20 II 0 How much did the Parks group make out of the 
21 Elkridpe Proieet? 
22 A I don't know. 
23 I 0 Wasn't i t in excess o~ $200,000? 
24 MR. HOUARD: W e l l , h e s a i d h e d i d n ' t k n o w , 
25 THE COURT: I t ' s c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n , Counse l 




 I! A . I donf t know. 
0 Wasn't it reallv closer to $500,000.00 that 
Fred Smith and Don Skipworth made you down there? 
6
 II A I donf z know. 
7
 II C H a d n ' t Formen C o r p o r a t i o n a l r e a d y p u r c h a s e d t h 
8
 I' p r o p e r z y b e f o r e y o u r f a m i l y came i n t o t h e d e a l and j u s t 
9 
10 
b o u g h t i t and p a i d t h e money t o Former: C o r p o r a t i o n to pay 
f o r the p r o p e r t y ? 
11
 || A F . l k r i d g e R a n c h e s " 
12 o Y e s . 
13
 A Not t o my k n o w l e d g e . 
14
 I Q Do you know? 
15 A No, I d o n ' t . 
16 o r)±r\ y O U e v e r s e n o n e l o t i n t h e E l k r i d g e 
1? |j P r o j e c t y o u r s e l f ? 
18
 I A N o . 
19
 Q Did you try for a long period of time? 
20 A I told you for two weeks we did. 
21 0 Weil, weren't you down there frequently at the 
22 J sales office? Didn't you spend six months in the sales 
23 o f f i c e ? 
24 A No, s i r . 
25 Q D i d n ' t you spend months i n t h e s a l e s o f f i c e 
wx.v/^^> ^ iva i i u .ua i—LVJ i i UJL L / C l XdyJLUL 
Q Now, where did the money come from to buy 
the Hideaway Valley Property? 
A Fred told me he was taking it from the Elk-
ridge Project. 
Q From the Joint Venture funds? 
A That is correct. 
Q And that would be half Formen's money and half 
Parks1 money; is that right? 
A That's the only way I understand it. 
Q Alright. So the land in the second deal was 
paid for out of money that was half Formen's and half 
Parks'? 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, we object because thi 
is outside the scope of direct examination. I don't think 
there's any dispute about it. We've been over it three 
or four times as to how they got the money and how it was 
paid for, and we're only talking about water for the lots 
that we've got in the exchange agreement. 
THE COURT: Well, the objection's overruled, 
it's cross examination. 
Q Is that right? 
A Yes, that was my understanding. 
Q Now, if the deal was the same on the second 
program for Hideaway, as it was on the first, shouldn't 
whoever put up the monev for the land get half of the 
1
 Q Well, isn't that what you just said? Didn't 
2 this -- now, you talk about Paragraph 9 as applying to 
3 bankruptcy but I'm saying isn't it instead the Paragraph 
4 2 provision that would apply in the event of a bankruptcy 
5 and Paragraph 9 would apply in the event of a termina-
6 tion? 
7 J MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, that's argumentative 
8 i The Court will make that determination. 
J 
9 I MR. SUMMERHAYS: Well, Your Honor --
10 THE COURT: This is cross examination. 
11 The objection's overruled. He nay answer if he can and, 
12 | if he can't, he can say so or sa:/, MI don't know." 
13 A It looks like they both do. 
14 Q Doesn't this apply in the event of termina-
ls I tion, Paragraph 9? 
16 I A Yes. 
17 I Q And t h i s Paragraph 2 appl ies in the event they 
18 are unable to continue to make the payments for t h i s 
19 I 75,000 for any reason, then you'd come in and have the 
r i g h t to make those payments; i s n ' t t ha t r i gh t ? 
A I'm not sure . 
Q Do you know whether or not Formen Corporation 
has ever defaulted in any of its payments on this 75,000? 
A I have no idea. 
Q You have no evidence of that being the case; 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
